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Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously:  
The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter 
David S. Olson∗ 
Abstract 
Courts, the Patent Office, and commentators are in vigorous 
disagreement about what types of innovation should be patentable, and 
what, if any, innovation should remain off-limits to patenting. This Article 
shows that the disarray in the area of patentable subject matter results from 
a widespread failure to take the utilitarian policy underlying patent law 
seriously. Despite near-universal agreement that patent rights exist to 
provide incentives for innovation by allowing inventors to recoup their 
costs of research and development, courts have expanded patentable subject 
matter to many new fields without first demanding evidence that the newly 
patentable fields suffer from lack of incentives to innovate. The failure to 
ask the threshold question of whether patents are needed in a particular field 
to achieve efficient levels of innovation has resulted in both incoherent case 
law on patentable subject matter, and costs to society from increased patent 
monopolies. 
This Article explains that the sensible basis for determining 
patentable subject matter is to determine whether innovation is unlikely in 
the absence of patents. Part II of the Article sets forth an explanation and 
model showing that there is no reason to expand patentable subject matter 
into fields where innovation is already healthy due to other incentives such 
as low R&D costs, lead-time or reputation benefits from innovation, or 
other legal protections such as trade secret and copyright law. To the extent 
that others argue for patentability even where there is no market failure in 
innovation, they are not following the utilitarian rationale for patent law, 
and incoherence results.  
Part III of the Article demonstrates how courts historically 
considered the issue of innovation market failure, at least implicitly, in their 
decisions as to what types of inventions were not patentable. But with the 
advent of software and the Information Age, the courts’ patentable subject 
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matter tests no longer fit. Rather than reworking their tests to serve patent 
law’s underlying rationale, they instead slowly abandoned their role as 
gatekeepers of patentable subject matter, resulting in the current inefficient 
regime in which almost all innovation is patentable. The courts failure to 
grapple with the utilitarian rationale for patentability means that current 
judicial consideration of patentable subject matter continues to be 
misdirected. Part IV applies the model and explanation from Part II to the 
sample case of business methods—one of the fastest growing and most 
harmful areas of patenting—showing an example of a field in which patents 
are not efficient. Finally, Part VI urges that the courts or Congress return 
consideration of market failure to the center of patentable subject matter 
determinations.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is widespread agreement that the reason we have a patent 
system is utilitarian—to solve a market failure problem. The theory is that 
absent the right to exclude that patents provide, copycats will quickly enter 
the market and drive down prices below the price at which the inventor can 
recoup her research and development costs. In other words, without patent 
grants, too little innovation will occur because the rational inventor will not 
bother to invent knowing that she will not be able to recoup the cost of 
invention.1 It is also well-recognized that our patent system’s mechanism 
for incentivizing innovation—granting property rights to inventors—causes 
deadweight loss to society in the form of higher prices and some consumers 
ending up priced out of the market. Accordingly, a properly crafted patent 
law should provide enough property rights to incentivize the socially 
desirable (efficient) level of innovation, and no more. Patents broader in 
scope or longer in duration than the inventor needs to recoup her costs of 
invention (research and development) inevitably harm society in the form of 
higher prices on patented goods, fewer numbers of consumers able to 
purchase the patented goods, and decreased GDP through deadweight loss.  
A review of patent literature confirms the widespread agreement on 
the above propositions.2 It is, therefore, anomalous and troubling that the 
                                                 
1 The utilitarian rationale for patent law is set forth explicitly in the Constitution. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”) Moreover, a survey of patent law casebooks shows that law students are 
uniformly taught that our patent system exists to achieve explicitly utilitarian aims: 
incentivizing the production and distribution of innovation. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES & 
JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-13 (4th ed. 2007); 
MARTIN ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 33-45 (1998); 
WILLIAM H. FRANCIS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 66-73 (4th ed. 
1995); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 127 (Rev. 4th ed. 2007); ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL 
KWALL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT, AND PATENT LAW 553 
(1996). 
2 See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A 
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70-90 (1969) (analyzing the 
tradeoff between patents’ enhanced incentives and the reduction in competition due to 
patent exclusivity); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 247, 247 (1994) (discussing the utilitarian basis for patent law); Robert P. 
Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 
76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 808-09 (1988) (laying out the utilitarian motivation for patent 
protection); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
(Continued…) 
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current law in the U.S. regarding what types of inventions are eligible for 
patenting (patentable subject matter) has developed with little explicit 
consideration of the utilitarian question that should guide our crafting of 
patent law, and especially of the determination of which subject matter 
should be patentable. If we are utilitarian about patent law, then the 
question to be asked for each potentially patentable subject matter is 
whether there is a market failure present such that granting patentable 
subject matter status to a particular type of innovation will do more harm 
than good? If there is, the subject matter should be patentable. If not, no 
patent rights should exist for that area of innovation. Thus, when it comes to 
whether a particular type of innovation should be patentable, the following 
questions should be asked. (1) Would this type of innovation occur at 
sufficient levels without a patent grant? (2) Would granting a patent right 
for this type of innovation cause more loss to society than gain? (3) If 
society would not benefit from granting patentability to the particular type 
of innovation, can sufficiently clear lines be drawn between this subject 
matter and other subject matter that does need the protection of 
patentability? If the answer to the third question is no, then a fourth 
question should be asked: (4) considering as a whole the type of subject 
matter within which the particular subtype of innovation that does not need 
patentability falls, does society gain or lose from granting patents to the 
broader subject matter as a whole?  
While this analysis and these questions naturally follow from taking 
seriously patent law’s purpose of solving market failures, it may be 
surprising for the non-initiate to learn that the courts have allowed a 
breathtaking expansion of patentable subject matter in the last few decades 
                                                 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 839 (1990) (noting that “the economic significance of a 
patent depends on its scope: the broader the scope, the larger the number of competing 
products and processes that will infringe the patent” and further noting that “proprietary 
control of technology tend to cause ‘dead weight’ costs due to restrictions on use.”); Julie 
E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 50 (2001) (stating that the “central task” of the patent system is “ensuring 
sufficient rewards (and therefore sufficient incentives) to patentees while avoiding an 
unnecessary degree of deadweight loss to society as a whole.”); Edmund W. Kitch, The 
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (setting forth the 
thoroughly utilitarian “prospect theory” of patents); Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should 
the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990); Alan Greenspan, 
Remarks at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Economic Summit: 
Intellectual Property Rights (Feb. 27, 2004)  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200402272/default.htm (querying 
“[a]re the protections sufficiently broad to encourage innovation but not so broad as to shut 
down follow-on innovation?”). 
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without any discussion as to whether each new area of patentability is 
welfare-enhancing. Some might justify this by arguing that the patentable 
subject matter section of the patent statute does not say anything about 
granting patents only in cases of market failure. This is true, but such an 
argument ignores that for most of the history of this country, courts limited 
patentable subject matter in ways that, at least implicitly, sought to deny 
patentability where it was likely that no market failure was present. Such 
limitations are now almost non-existent, although, likely in an effort to 
avoid Supreme Court review, the Federal Circuit has shown recently that it 
will disallow patents on processes not tied to any physical implementation,3 
and has decided to review its patentable subject matter jurisprudence en 
banc.4 
The purpose of this Article is threefold. First, the Article seeks to 
answer the question: why has this large expansion of patentable subject 
matter occurred without any seeming analysis of its efficiency? Second, 
using business methods as a specific example, the Article argues that not all 
types of innovation need the incentive of a patent grant to be produced at a 
socially desirable level. Third, the Article suggests that while courts could 
take the utilitarian analysis into account and return to the roles they played 
as crafters of a federal common law of patentable subject matter for the first 
century and a half of this country’s existence, the optimal solution may be 
to assign an administrative agency with the task of conducting explicit 
utilitarian analysis and rulemaking in determining what types of innovation 
should be patentable.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Following this introduction, Part II 
explains the utilitarian basis for patent law, the basic economics of the 
market failure problem that patent law seeks to solve, and the corresponding 
problem of deadweight loss that is created from patent protection. Part II 
explains the indisputable harms that come from granting patents where they 
are not needed. 
Part III examines the federal courts’ historic approach to patentable 
subject matter (“PSM”). PSM has always been defined very broadly in the 
patent statutes. Nevertheless, starting almost immediately, courts limited the 
types of innovations that qualified for patentability. Courts early on 
excluded abstract ideas, phenomena of nature, and laws of nature from 
patentability. These exclusions were sensible, because any increased 
                                                 
3 See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (2007); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
4 In re Bilski, 264 Fed. App’x 896 (2008). 
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incentive to innovate arising from patentability would have been far 
overshadowed by the cost to society of allowing ownership of these types of 
inventions and discoveries. In effect, the courts treated the broad wording of 
the PSM section of the patent statute as an invitation to engage in crafting a 
federal common law of PSM. This federal common law approach continued 
for almost two hundred years. Generally, the courts’ determinations of what 
should not be PSM lined up with areas that likely did not need the incentive 
of a patent grant, or for which the patent grant would be unduly costly.  
Historically, the federal courts did a fairly good job of denying 
patentability to the types of innovations that did not require patentability to 
be produced at socially optimal levels. Regardless of whether this resulted 
from fortuitous accident, or from an implicitly utilitarian approach to 
patentable subject matter, the courts have now largely abandoned their role 
as gatekeepers of subject matter patentability. A review of the history of 
patentable subject matter jurisprudence shows that for much of U.S. history 
the federal courts took it upon themselves to analyze classes of subject 
matter and exclude from patentability those types of innovation for which 
the patent grant likely would increase beneficial invention by less than the 
patent monopoly would cost society.  
Critics of the courts’ approach to PSM cases have pointed out that, 
especially with regard to older cases, the decisions sometimes seemed to 
turn on the issue of claim scope as much as PSM. The courts were wary 
about granting patent claims that were too broad or that allowed the 
invention to be described and claimed at too high a level of abstraction. 
This phenomenon certainly occurred in some of the cases, and for sensible 
reasons. If patentees were allowed to claim their invention at too high a 
level of abstraction, then their patent claims might cover more than they had 
actually invented, and such claims would have allowed patentees to block 
subsequent innovation.5 But in addition to cases in which claim scope was 
perhaps the core issue, courts also held that some types of innovation 
simply were not patentable under the patent act. The case law review in Part 
III shows that a utilitarian market failure analysis seems to have underlain 
courts’ analyses in these cases, and that generally the courts got the cost-
benefit question right. 
In Part III, I also engage the argument of some commentators that 
substantive PSM analysis was rightly abandoned because patents can be 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465 (1895). 
These days courts reject such claims on the grounds of inadequate written description or 
enablement. 35 U.S.C. § 112.  
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adequately examined under the statutory sections analyzing novelty, non-
obviousness, written description and enablement. I point out that while it is 
true that individual patent claims in some cases (especially very old cases) 
could be better analyzed under other sections of the Patent Act, it simply 
does not follow that this means that all types of innovation need patent 
grants to be produced at adequate levels. Put differently, it does not follow 
from analyzing particular decisions about the scope of particular claims that 
no analysis should ever be done as to whether a type of innovation suffers 
from a market failure problem. There are obviously types of innovation for 
which R&D costs are low, and trade secrecy, head starts, lock-ins, or other 
sets of incentives adequately incentivize innovation. These types of 
innovations should not receive patent protection if we are concerned with 
achieving higher levels of societal welfare. 
Part III finishes its review of PSM case law by showing that in 
recent decades, as technology and innovation have moved from the physical 
to the electronic and intangible—to computers, software, and Information 
Age processes—the traditional tests that courts developed to distinguish 
unpatentable subject matter have seemed inadequate. By relying on ossified 
tests instead of the underlying utilitarian calculus that courts historically 
used, at least implicitly, the courts in recent years found themselves in both 
line-drawing predicaments and in situations where innovation that 
obviously suffers from a market failure problem would be excluded by strict 
application of their old PSM tests. Instead of reworking their PSM tests for 
the Information Age, the pro-patent Federal Circuit, and to a lesser but still 
significant extent, the Supreme Court, simply threw up their hands and 
started reading section 101 of the patent statute broadly, such that virtually 
“anything under the sun made by man”6 became patentable. While this 
eliminated the trouble of making hard decisions regarding PSM, patent 
examiners and courts left with only the remaining sections of the patent act 
as screens for patentability have been unable to refuse granting patents 
where they are not needed to incentivize invention. 
Thus, federal courts have largely stopped denying patents based on 
rulings about the patentability of broad subject classes. Notwithstanding 
two recent Federal Circuit cases holding that it is still possible to draft a 
patent claim so untethered from the physical world that it will be denied for 
lack of patentable subject matter,7 the trend over the last decades toward 
                                                 
6 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) 
7 See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (2007); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
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allowing patents on virtually every type of subject matter is exemplified by 
such things as the allowance of patents on business methods,8 tax strategies9 
and sports moves;10 the elimination of the “technological arts” requirement 
for patentability; and the upholding of a patent on medical diagnosis in Lab. 
Corp. of Amer. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc.11  
This Article argues that while the abandonment of the PSM 
gatekeeper role happened for historically understandable reasons, it is very 
problematic. The case law shows how we are now left with a specialized 
patent court, the Federal Circuit, that has increasingly relied on a bare 
textualist approach to the Patent Act, creating the current situation in which 
inventions not traditionally considered within the “technological arts” are 
nonetheless patentable. Since the courts have stopped actively excluding 
certain subject matter from patentability, no one else has stepped in to 
perform this function. This Article analyzes how the present lack of any 
thoughtful arbiter of patentable subject matter is costly to society. After 
setting out a model to show how some classes of subject matter are 
appropriate for patentability while others are not, this Article applies the 
model to business methods and concludes that patentability for this subject 
matter is inefficient. This conclusion begets the corollary conclusion that 
the reinstatement of some entity in the patentable subject matter gatekeeper 
role is desirable. Not only would this go a long way toward preventing 
unmerited patents and their significant attendant costs to society, it would 
also decrease the number of patent applications that must be fully examined 
by an overburdened Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). 
The problem caused by unneeded patents has become more acute in 
recent years as entities have arisen that attempt to monetize patents not by 
practicing the patent, but by enforcing them aggressively against those who 
arguably infringe. This has led to a state of affairs in some industries, like 
software, in which firms forbid their employees from reviewing patents for 
fear of being sued for willfully infringing someone else’s patent.12 While 
this perverse behavior is caused in part by problems with the willfulness 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 5,960,411 (Amazon.com patent on 1-Click® ordering). 
9 See, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 6,567,790 (funding of a GRAT with nonqualified stock 
options); U.S. Pat. No. 6,292,788 (tax-deferred real estate transaction); U.S. Pat. No. 
7,149,712 (purchase of an annuity contract to fund a charitable remainder trust); U.S. Pat. 
No. 7,177,829 (H&R Block’sTax Refund System). 
10 See, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 5,616,089 (method of putting). 
11 548 U.S. 124 (2006). 
12 Mark A. Lemley et al., Ending Patent Law’s Willfullness Game, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1085 (2003). 
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standard for patent infringement,13 it is also quite telling that firms in some 
areas do not think that reading patents is necessary to their product 
development. In other words, the benefit of disclosure of new invention that 
is the quid pro quo for a patent is thought to be of little or no use in some 
fields. That some firms are competing and producing new products without 
any reliance on the innovation disclosed in patents in the relevant field 
should give us some pause as to the value of, and need for, such patents. 
The extension of patentability to new areas of innovation—some of 
which likely do not need the additional incentive—causes problems for the 
patent system in another way: it overburdens the patent office and 
correspondingly, more bad patents issue. There is wide consensus that 
thousands of unmerited patents are being granted each year.14 These patents 
lack merit either because they are obvious/non-novel, or because no one 
makes use of the patented invention.15 Unfortunately, such “worthless” 
patents are not costless. The owners of these patents increasingly are 
extracting payments from firms that do or make things that arguably are 
covered by these obvious or non-commercialized patents. Some entities 
have arisen that quite successfully monetize large portfolios of otherwise 
worthless patents. These entities are referred to disparagingly as “trolls,” 
and various reform proposals have been made to address them. While 
numerous commentators have suggested reforms to improve patent 
quality,16 knocking out whole areas of subject matter from patentability 
                                                 
13 Id.  
14 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521 
(2005) (identifying worthless patents based on patent expiration from lack of payment of 
maintenance fees); Mark A. Lemley et al., What to do About Bad Patents, IP L. & BUS., 
January 2006, at 20; Lawrence Lessig, The Problem With Patents, INDUS. STANDARD, Apr. 
23, 1999,  
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,4296,00.html.  
15 Some patents are simply absurd. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227, at [57] (filed 
Nov. 17, 2000) (“A method of swing[ing] on a swing is disclosed, in which a user 
positioned on a standard swing suspended by two chains from a substantially horizontal 
tree branch induces side to side motion by pulling alternately on one chain and then the 
other.”); U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2, 1993) (method of exercising a cat by 
inducing it to chase the dot projected by a laser pointer). 
16 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent 
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004); Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in 
Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179 (2007); Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent 
Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2007); Jay P. Kesan & Andres 
A. Gallo, Why ‘Bad’ Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We Change?—The 
Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61 (2006); Kristen Osenga, Entrance 
(Continued…) 
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would reduce the load on the patent office, allowing examiners to do a 
better job on patent examination. Moreover, although commentators have 
argued that patent quality will improve in areas of newly patentable subject 
matter as the PTO builds up its library of prior art and trains examiners in 
the new fields,17 such improvement seems to be a long time coming, 
judging by the continuing high volume of bad patents in areas that were 
formerly unpatentable, like software and business methods.18  
                                                 
Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes—Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the 
Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119 (2005). 
17 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Kuester & Lawrence E. Thompson, Risks Associated with 
Restricting Business Method and E-Commerce Patents, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 657, 681 
(2001): 
Every new technology presents the PTO with the challenges of creating a 
sufficient prior art database and channeling the expertise necessary to 
evaluate the prior art. Internet business method patents are similar, in this 
respect, to biotechnology and software. The PTO is designed to promote 
and incorporate new technologies; this, however, takes time. The PTO is 
taking steps to improve the prior art database and the expertise of the 
examining core. It is the authors’ belief that the PTO will be able to 
improve the prior art database over time; thus, the costs associated with 
the challenges of business patents will eventually be reduced. 
Id. See also, Jeffrey A. Berkowitz, Business Method Patents: Everybody Wants to Be a 
Millionaire, 609 PRAC. L. INST. 7, 9 (2000) (explaining that the prior art database will 
improve as a result of the influx of patent applications); Greg S. Fine, To Issue or Not to 
Issue: Analysis of the Business Method Patent Controversy on the Internet, 42 B.C. L. REV. 
1195, 1210 (2001) (“[W]ith greater wealth of prior art to evaluate novelty and greater 
resources to ensure that patent applications are not overly broad, the major causes of poor 
quality patents are being eliminated.”); Kevin M. Baird, Business Method Patents: Chaos 
at the USPTO or Business as Usual, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 347, 364 (“The lack of 
prior art references and examiner training has led to the issuance of many invalid business 
method patents resulting in more patent litigation and greater uncertainty in the patent 
system.”). 
18 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: 
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
577, 589 (1999) (“There are persistent reports that patents in the software area, and perhaps 
especially, patents for “business methods” implemented in software, are of extremely poor 
quality. People familiar with the technology involved and the history of various 
developments in it report that patents in this area are routinely issued which overlook 
clearly anticipating prior art.”); Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent 
Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 309, 323-24 (2002) (“Time pressure, lack of expertise, and 
lack of prior art yield low patent quality during floods. . . . And the technical breakthrough 
precipitating a flood might take a while to enter the prior art.”); NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., A 
PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 41-49 (Stephen A. Merill et al., eds., National 
Academies Press 2004) (“There are…several reasons to suspect that more issued patents 
are deviating from previous or at least desirable standards of utility, novelty, and especially 
(Continued…) 
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Part IV analyzes the specific example of business methods and 
concludes that business methods are one area of innovation that does not 
need the incentive of patentability. Rather, Part IV shows that, in fact, 
patents on business methods preclude competition and harm consumers.  
Part V discusses solutions to the problem. First, the Supreme Court 
and the Federal Circuit could resume their roles as gatekeepers of subject 
matter patentability. Recent cases suggest that both courts are considering 
doing just that.19 Second, if courts are unwilling to resume their historic role 
as subject matter gatekeepers given current broad construction of section 
101 of the Patent Act, then Congress could pass legislation explicitly setting 
forth a utilitarian calculus that courts and the PTO should use in 
determining whether particular types of innovation should qualify as 
patentable subject matter. A third, and perhaps better, solution may be for 
Congress to delegate the determination of categories of patentable subject 
matter to an administrative agency, perhaps in the form of creating a 
commission within the PTO to hold hearings, take evidence, and decide 
what subject matter is patentable.  
II. The Efficient Functioning of the Patent System 
A. The Patent System Exists to Promote Public Goods 
The Patent Act is enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution, which grants Congress the power to provide patent and 
copyright protection. The patent laws are codified as 35 U.S.C. § 100 et seq. 
Section 101 states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”20 Section 101 does two things. 
First, it sets forth the subject matter that may be patented—any “process, 
                                                 
non-obviousness and that this problem is more pronounced in fast-moving areas of 
technology newly subject to patenting than in established, less rapidly changing fields.”); 
Susan Walmsley Graf, Improving Patent Quality Through Identification of Relevant Prior 
Art: Approaches to Increase Information Flow to the Patent Office, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 495, 504 (2007) (“[I]t is widely perceived that in the software and business method 
areas, where there is a short history of patenting and there is not a strong tradition of non-
patent literature publishing, much that is known will not be found in prior art searches.”). 
19 Metabolite, 548 U.S. 124; Bilski, 264 F. App’x 896. 
20 35 U.S.C. § 101. The term “process” is defined by 35 U.S.C. §100(b): “The term 
‘process’ means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.” 
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machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”21 Second, it requires that 
a thing be “new” and “useful” before patent protection is granted.22  
The other primary sections of the Patent Act that determine whether 
a patent is granted are sections 102, 103, and 112. Section 102 specifies the 
requirements an invention or discovery must meet to be determined novel.23 
Section 103 requires that an invention be “nonobvious.”24 Finally, Section 
112 requires that a patent enable a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
practice the invention without undue experimentation, that the patent 
contain adequate written description to delimit the patent grant, and that the 
applicant disclose her best mode of practicing the invention.25  
I take as a well-accepted starting point that the purpose of a patent is 
to encourage inventors to produce socially valuable goods that would not 
otherwise be produced.26 So long as the cost of copying someone else’s 
                                                 
21 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
22 The bar for usefulness is set quite low, however. An applicant need merely show 
operational, beneficial, and specific utility. This means that an applicant’s invention must 
work as intended (this is presumed), that it must be capable of some beneficial use (to be 
judged by the market), and that the inventor must know for what, specifically, the invention 
is useful. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. OrangeBang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re 
Fisher 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005); USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). If an application clears these low utility hurdles, it will be granted 
a patent. The extent of its usefulness is left to be decided by the market, as Judge Story 
explained in Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C. Mass. 1817):  
[I]f the invention steers wide of these objections, whether it be more or 
less useful is a circumstance very material to the interests of the patentee, 
but of no importance to the public. If it be not extensively useful, it will 
silently sink into contempt and disregard.  
23 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
24 35 U.S.C. § 103 (“A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not 
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not 
be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.”)  
25 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or 
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the 
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”) 
26 Note that while there is wide agreement that the purpose of the patent laws is to 
encourage invention, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free 
Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005) (“Intellectual property protection in the United 
States has always been about generating incentives to create.”), this position is not without 
(Continued…) 
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invention is less than the cost of inventing, inventors are not incentivized to 
invent, because they are unable to recover the costs of inventing. This is 
known as a public goods problem. The patent system solves the public 
goods problem of invention by granting inventors monopoly rights27 over 
the production and sale of their inventions for a limited period of time—
currently twenty years from the filing of a patent.28 The ensuing monopoly 
                                                 
critics. For example, F. Scott Kieff disagrees that the purpose of this section of the 
Constitution, or at least of the patent laws as enacted, is to encourage invention and 
disclosure. Kieff argues that patents are not necessarily efficacious in encouraging 
invention and that the current patent laws were rather written “to facilitate 
commercialization of new goods and services.” F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and 
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 753 (2001). Kieff 
contends that “treatment of patents as property rights provides incentives for the investment 
and ordering of private activities necessary for such a complex commercialization process 
while at the same time providing a workable framework for deciding which inventive 
activities merit government intervention in the first instance.” Id. This debate is beyond the 
scope of this Article. Instead, in this Article I adopt the generally accepted view that the 
purpose of the Progress Clause of the Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8) is to 
encourage invention. 
27 Note that my use of the term “patent monopoly” or “monopoly rights” in this 
context is not meant to refer to a producer who has monopoly power in a certain market. 
Rather, I use the term in this section to signify that the patent right gives the holder 
exclusive control over the use of the patented technology to make products or practice 
methods covered by the patent.  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to patents as “monopolies.” See, e.g., 
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 342 (1971) (“Although 
recognizing the patent system’s desirable stimulus to invention, we have also viewed the 
patent as a monopoly which, although sanctioned by law, has the economic consequences 
attending other monopolies.”); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); 
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (“a 
patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a 
free and open market. The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent, 
therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from 
backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are 
kept within their legitimate scope.”); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 
(1942); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). 
The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, has often derided the use of the term “patent 
monopoly.” See, e.g., Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(“It is but an obfuscation to refer to a patent as ‘the patent monopoly’ or to describe a 
patent as an ‘exception to the general rule against monopolies.’”); In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 
1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 
1559 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Further, this court has disapproved of a challenger’s 
characterization of a patentee by the term ‘monopolist,’ which is commonly regarded as 
pejorative.”). 
28 See 35 U.S.C. § 154.  
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rents act as incentives to invent. But monopoly rights also entail obvious 
costs to society—the so-called “deadweight loss” of monopoly. Society’s 
goal should be to provide the efficient quantity of patent protection, that 
quantity of protection that maximizes the difference between these benefits 
and costs. 
The patent monopoly granted to inventors is hefty: inventors have 
the sole right to make, sell, use, or license their inventions. Anyone else 
who makes, sells, uses, or licenses the invention or an equivalent thereof—
even if that person invented it independently—infringes the patent and can 
be enjoined from practicing the patent and made to pay damages.29  
This hefty monopoly power is only granted in exchange for new, 
useful, and nonobvious inventions, and it is only granted in exchange for a 
disclosure of the invention that is sufficient to enable a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to make the invention.30 The system also is designed 
to keep the price paid by society in the form of the patent monopoly, with 
its resultant decreased competition and increased costs, less than the benefit 
that society gains from the increased invention of new, useful, nonobvious 
things.31 Thus it is vitally important that the patent laws be properly 
balanced. If the patent laws extend too far, they decrease social utility by 
allowing more harm to society from patent monopoly than is gained by 
promoting new inventions. If the patent laws provide too little protection for 
inventions, then social utility is decreased because inventors do not have 
adequate incentive to invent.32 
                                                 
29 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
30 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112. 
31 Robert Nozick argues that the patent monopoly should exist only for the period of 
time when no one else would have thought of the invention. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, 
STATE AND UTOPIA, 178-182 (1974). Actually, the benefit may still exceed the cost of the 
patent even if someone else would have invented the same thing late in the patent’s 
coverage. A cost benefit analysis must be done weighing the incentive needed by the 
inventor against the benefit to the public of having the invention earlier than someone else 
would have invented it. But in any case, patent protection should not extend beyond the 
point at which the cost of protection equals the public benefit from the early invention. And 
in fact, the policy should be to try to give the minimum amount of protection needed to 
incentivize adequate levels of invention. 
Nozick also argues that, conceptually, patent protection should not apply to cases of 
independent invention, but that difficulties of proving this, combined with the fact that few 
will try to invent something from scratch once it has been invented and made public, may 
make it reasonable to exclude all others after an invention is patented. See id. 
32 Judge Posner explained the economics behind patent law in Roberts v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1983). Judge Posner asserted that patent protection 
should be granted only for inventions that would not otherwise be developed. Posner’s 
(Continued…) 
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B. The Efficiency of Patentability Determinations at the 
Level of Subject Matter Classes: (Re)Applying Economic 
Analysis 
Although the Patent Act attempts to guard against patent monopolies 
being granted for old or obvious inventions or for inventions that have not 
been adequately disclosed to the public, the Act leaves open two areas of 
inefficiency. First, the current patent application examination regime 
overwhelms patent examiners with the sheer number of patents that must be 
examined.33 Second, examining a patent application for novelty, non-
obviousness, and disclosure/enablement does not alone assure that patents 
                                                 
view is that the nonobvious standard should serve the strictly economic purpose of 
awarding patent protection only when such protection is a necessary incentive to spur 
invention. Thus, for Posner, patent grants for inventions developed in a flash of inspiration 
are troubling, since the inventive process required no incentive to occur. Posner rationalizes 
the fact that patent law grants protection in these cases by claiming that such protection 
encourages potential inventors to seek the training necessary for experiencing such flashes 
of creative brilliance. Id.  
While it may be that, historically, independent invention was rare once a patent had 
issued, if this was once so, it is no longer. In recent years numerous patents have been 
asserted against firms that began their allegedly infringing activity without any knowledge 
of the patent See, e.g., IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). In fact, many firms forbid their engineers and researchers from reading patents 
so that they can avoid liability for willful infringement. Mark A. Lemley et al., Ending 
Patent Law’s Willfullness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2003). Multiple instances 
of independent invention are thus common in some fields. 
33 The current patent regime requires that patent examiners thoroughly examine a 
patent and list all bases for rejection, rather than working in a piecemeal fashion as bases 
for rejection are discovered and overcome. This requirement obviously increases the 
amount of time that must be spent on even facially invalid patents, and consequently leads 
to less time overall for examining any patent. See FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE 
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 
(2003), reprinted in 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 861, 872 (2004) (“Hearings participants 
estimated that patent examiners have from 8 to 25 hours to read and understand each 
application, search for prior art, evaluate patentability, communicate with the applicant, 
work out necessary revisions, and reach and write up conclusions. Many found these time 
constraints troubling.”); Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the 
U.S. Patent System – Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 
995-96 (2004) (“There is evidence that patent grant rates have also risen, suggesting that 
time pressures have led to less scrutiny of each individual application. These are signs of a 
system under stress.”); Susan Walmsley Graf, Improving Patent Quality Through 
Identification of Relevant Prior Art: Approaches to Increase Information Flow to the 
Patent Office, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 495, 502 (2007) (“This more than tripling in the 
rate of utility application filings has resulted in overburdened examiners who have little 
time to devote to each patent application.”). 
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are granted only on inventions for which society realizes gains greater than 
the costs of the monopoly rights under consideration. Nowhere does the 
Patent Act explicitly state that patent examiners should reject a patent if it is 
not needed to incentivize the particular type of invention. Instead, courts 
and the PTO traditionally have interpreted section 101 of the Patent Act as a 
basis for rejecting types of inventions for which it is not efficient to provide 
patents.34 Specifically, courts and the PTO have traditionally ruled that 
particular classes of subject matter are outside the realm of patentability.  
This subject matter discrimination was efficient for two reasons. 
First, it allowed courts to exclude classes of matter for which the patent 
grant was not needed to incentivize invention, or for which the deadweight 
loss of the patent monopoly obviously outweighed any increased incentive. 
Second, by excluding certain classes of subject matter, the courts increased 
the efficiency of the PTO by eliminating whole classes of inventions from 
examination. 
1. Basic Economics of Patent Monopolies35 
Before introducing the subject matter patentability model in the next 
subsection, this subsection first gives a synopsis of the economic 
explanation for the general need for patents to incentivize invention, as well 
as the costs to society that come from patent monopolies.  
Potential inventors must decide what quantity of time and resources 
to invest in inventing. The returns from inventing are the revenues an 
inventor can gain from selling, licensing, or using her invention. An 
inventor will choose to invent to the extent that she can get greater returns 
from her next invention than from other investments of her time and talent. 
Once she has an invention, she will seek to make money from it.  
If she cannot exclude rivals from entering the market for her 
invention, she will often not be able to recoup her costs of invention 
because competitors will be able to copy her invention and undersell her 
                                                 
34 Courts and the PTO have not done an explicit efficiency analysis when determining 
unpatentable subject matter, but I argue in this Article that such analysis underlay their 
subject matter patentability determinations. See infra, part III. 
35 Because the cost to society due to patent monopolies is a crucial component of this 
Article, I set out in this section a brief explanation of the economics of competitive and 
monopoly markets. It is well known that monopolies are costly to society. Economists call 
the loss to society caused by monopolies “deadweight loss.” This subsection sets out the 
basic economic explanation for why monopolies cause deadweight loss. Readers familiar 
with basic economics, as well as those who accept that monopolies cause loss to society but 
who are not interested in seeing the graphical demonstration of that loss, may want to skip 
this subsection and proceed directly to the model set out in the next subsection. 
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because they have no costs of invention to recoup. In many cases, once the 
product goes on sale it takes little time and expense for competitors to gain 
the knowledge and ability to make the invented product. Economists call 
this free dissemination of the knowledge needed to make the invention a 
“public good.” Such knowledge is non-excludable, and one person’s use of 
the knowledge does not prevent another from using it.36 Accordingly, the 
rational producer will not expend resources to invent in a competitive 
market when she cannot make back the cost of her investment in inventing.  
This is a classic example of what economists call a “public goods 
problem,” and illustrates why public goods such as inventions are often 
under-produced in a competitive market. The classic solution to a public 
goods problem is to subsidize production of the public good. The patent 
system does this by granting inventors patents that give them the exclusive 
                                                 
36 Inventors often develop means to overcome the nonexcludable nature of their 
invention, such as requiring employees to contract not to reveal company trade secrets. See 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual 
Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1494 (2002) (“As a substitute for patent protection, trade 
secrecy presents businesses with a choice between patent and trade secret protection. While 
firms can elect either option, they cannot employ both modes to protect the same 
information.”) This may provide effective protection from competition and thus delay the 
emergence of a competitive market. When trade secret protection is available to inventors, 
no patent is needed. In other cases, however, such as when the invention is sold publicly, 
keeping the invention a trade secret is not an option. In cases where both patent protection 
and trade secret protection is available, a rationale inventor will elect whichever regime 
gives greater protection. See Dan L. Burk, Legal Constraint of Genetic Use Restriction 
Technologies, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 335, 348 (2004) (“Thus the inventor’s choice is an 
election between twenty years of certain patent protection or perpetual, but less certain, 
trade secret protection—a choice that in any given instance hardly can be said to have a 
foregone outcome.”). Thus, if an inventor feels confident that she can keep her invention 
secret for more than twenty years, she will elect trade secrecy over patenting. Note, Patent 
Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of Inventions Meeting Judicial Standards of 
Patentability, 87 HARV. L. REV. 807, 821 (1974) (“Although there are thus several factors 
which indicate that patentable inventions will ordinarily be patented, there are situations in 
which an inventor with a clearly patentable innovation may prefer to rely on trade secret 
protection rather than to apply for a patent.”). Note that an inventor is not allowed to elect 
trade secrecy and then patentability serially. See Ellen Lauver Weber, Patenting Inventions 
that Embody Computer Programs Held as Trade Secrets- White Consolidated Industries v. 
Vega Servo-Control, 713 F.2d 788 (Fed. Cir. 1983), 59 WASH. L. REV. 601, 604-05 (1984). 
(“Thus, the secrecy essential to trade secret protection is incompatible with patent 
protection. This policy conflict requires an inventor to choose between trade secret 
protection and patent protection.”). 
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right to control their invention for twenty years. Once an inventor has a 
patent, she has monopoly power, at least with regard to her invention.37  
Once a patentee has market power as to her invention, she will 
charge a price above the competitive level. This has two consequences: 
First, some money that would have stayed in consumers’ pockets (consumer 
surplus) in a competitive market now goes to the monopolist. This is a 
redistribution of surplus between consumers and the producer (rents), and is 
not in itself a source of inefficiency.38 But the second consequence of supra-
competitive pricing is that consumers who value the good above its 
competitive price but below the price charged by the patentee will no longer 
buy the good. Thus, some of the surplus that would exist in a competitive 
market is lost. This lost surplus, the “deadweight loss” (L) from monopoly, 
is a source of inefficiency. In addition, allocation inefficiency is created 
because resources that would have gone to making additional units of the 
invention now go to a lower-valued use. Thus, society’s total utility is less 
than in a competitive market. This deadweight loss from monopoly provides 
the efficiency-based rationale for antitrust law.39  
2. Economic Model Showing the Need for Subject 
Matter Discrimination 
Society must strike a balance between a system with no patent 
protection and fewer inventions than socially optimal, and a system of 
                                                 
37 The primary characteristics of a monopoly are: (1) a single seller who is (2) a price 
maker in (3) a market with blocked entry, and (4) who sells a good with no close 
substitutes. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS (5th ed. 1999). Patent 
holders are single sellers, at least if they choose not to license others. They sell in a market 
with blocked entry because the patent allows them to legally block others from making, 
using, or selling their invention. Whether the patented invention has close substitutes such 
that the patent holder can be a true price maker is another question. In reality, many 
patented goods may have close substitutes in the market. In such situations the inventor’s 
ability to extract monopoly rents is diminished accordingly. If patents are effective, 
however, they must either confer some pricing power, or at least lead inventors to believe 
that they will confer pricing power, sufficient to compensate the inventor for investing the 
cost of invention, or the inventor would not be incentivized to produce the invention in the 
first place. 
38 But note that the shift in money from consumer to producer may raise fairness, 
equality, or distributional concerns. 
39 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 
15-20 (2005). 
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overly broad patent protection and a large cost to society from the 
deadweight loss of patent monopolies.40  
One can graphically represent three different possible relationships 
between amount of increased invention (I) and monopoly deadweight loss 
(L) that result from patent protection. In Figures 1a, 2a, and 3a, amount of 
patent protection (p) is graphed on the horizontal axis. For the sake of 
simplicity, the amount of patent protection is considered as one continuous 
variable. Thus, longer patent durations and increased areas of patent 
coverage—such as a broader interpretation of the breadth of patent 
coverage—are both represented as simply increasing patent protection (p).41 
The vertical axis measures dollar value. These figures assume that for 
increased invention (I) there are diminishing marginal returns to increased 
patent protection (p).42 This reflects the assumption that a switch from zero 
patent protection to a grant of a three-year patent is likely to lead to a larger 
increase in invention (I) than a switch from a twelve-year to fifteen-year 
monopoly.43 Deadweight loss (L) is modeled as a straight line. This means 
                                                 
40 In this analysis I make the reasonable assumption that amount of innovation (I) 
increases as patent protection increases but that the increase is at a decreasing rate. I 
assume that the deadweight loss from patent protection increases at a constant rate. 
41 In reality, the term of a patent, the breadth of claims, the strength of equivalents 
protection, etc., may be functions of patent protection that are somewhat discontinuous. For 
the sake of simplicity, however, and because an aggregation effect is likely to smooth out 
the discontinuity somewhat, for purposes of this model everything that may increase a 
patent’s strength is modeled simply as amount of patent protection (p). 
42 In other words, dI/dp is a decreasing function of p. 
43 Of course, there may be individual cases in which this assumption does not hold. 
For instance, if a patentee thinks that his patented invention will only develop a significant 
market after several years of marketing, in such a case the marginal value of an additional 
three years of patent protection will be greater at the end of the patent term than at the 
beginning. Likewise, a small increase in the subject matter covered by the law of 
equivalents may induce relatively little additional invention, but once the equivalents 
coverage increases to a certain level a large jump in invention may occur as inventors 
imagine being able to apply their patents to vastly wider areas. In such a case the amount of 
invention, I, would not be a smoothly increasing function of p (amount of patent 
protection), but would instead discontinuously jump upwards at the point that inventors 
saw great potential for additional coverage and profits. Notwithstanding that there are 
likely numerous examples in which amount of invention, I, is not a continuously increasing 
variable of p, it seems reasonable to assume for the sake of this model that in the aggregate 
such factors will balance out such that I can be modeled as a continuously increasing 
function of p. For instance, for each patent that takes a few years to establish a market, 
there may be other patents in fields where the technology has changed to such an extent 
after three years that the patent is virtually worthless. 
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that deadweight loss (L) is a constantly increasing function of patent 
protection (p).44 This reflects the assumption that deadweight loss (L) from 
patent protection is as high in one year as it was the year before.45  
                                                 
44 In other words, dL/dp = k. 
45 Because the deadweight loss from monopoly is assumed to be the same each year 
the patent is in effect, the total deadweight loss from a patent will increase at a constant 
rate. If a one-year monopoly yields total deadweight loss = L, a two-year monopoly will 
yield twice that amount of deadweight loss (2 x L), a three-year monopoly will yield thrice 
the deadweight loss (3 x L), etc. Of course, for the same reasons discussed in modeling the 
variable for amount of increased invention (I), for individual patents the deadweight loss 
may not be a smoothly increasing function of patent protection (p). For instance, in fields 
where technology is rapidly changing, a patent may become obsolete after ten years such 
that the deadweight loss is zero after that point. In other cases, in which it takes some time 
to establish a market, the deadweight loss may not be significant until after a few years. As 
with modeling amount of increased invention (I), however, it seems likely that in the 
aggregate these individual differences should even out such that it is reasonable to model 
deadweight loss (L) as a smoothly increasing function of patent protection. In the 
aggregate, it is indeed unlikely that deadweight loss (L) is a concave curve (i.e., that dL/dp 
is a decreasing function of p). This is because it is unlikely that on aggregate the fifth year 
of a monopoly should yield a smaller amount of deadweight loss than the fourth year. 
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Figures 1b, 2b, and 3b correspond to Figures 1a, 2a, and 3a, 
respectively. Here the horizontal axes again express amount of patent 
protection (p). The vertical axis measures utility in dollar value. For each of 
these Figures the curve represents the gain to overall utility from increased 
invention (I) minus the deadweight loss from the patent monopoly (L).   
For the class of inventions in Figure 1a, deadweight loss (L) is 
always less than increased invention (I). Figure 1b shows that utility 
continuously increases as patent protection is increased. Accordingly, for 
situations that correspond to Figure 1a, patent protection should always be 
granted. No amount of patent protection is too much; greater patent 
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protection (p) always yields increased values of utility (U). The relationship 
depicted in Figure 1a likely only exists theoretically. It is hard to imagine a 
class of subject matter or even a single item for which no amount of patent 
protection is too high.46  
The second possibility, as illustrated in Figure 2a, is that deadweight 
loss (L) is always greater than increased invention (I). Figure 2b illustrates 
that patent protection should never be granted to such subject matter 
because utility constantly decreases as patent protection increases. Abstract 
ideas and laws of nature most likely correspond to Figure 2a, because a 
patent on an unapplied abstract idea would confer monopoly power over all 
products and processes relying on the idea, resulting in enormous 
deadweight loss.47  
Discovery of natural phenomena also historically has been classified 
as unpatentable subject matter. This rule may derive more from a policy 
value of common ownership of the fruits of nature than from any economic 
rationale. Or perhaps this rule originated at a time when most natural 
phenomena were discovered by accident, or would have been discovered 
soon by another. For the scientist who spends years gathering plants in the 
rainforest and testing them to see if they have any positive medicinal value, 
however, the increase in invention/discovery provided by patent protection 
is likely to be greater than the deadweight loss of the patent monopoly, and 
thus the relationship in Figure 2 should not apply.48  
A third possibility is represented in Figure 3a. Here deadweight loss 
(L) is initially less than increased invention (I), but at some point 
deadweight loss (L) becomes greater than the additional amount of 
invention (I). Figure 3b shows that patent protection provides positive social 
utility up to the point where L = I. Past this point, patent protection 
decreases social utility. One can imagine that most currently patentable 
subject matter correspond to the curves in Figure 3. Mechanical devices are 
classic examples of figure 3a inventions. A limited time patent on a better 
                                                 
46 Even in the case of a natural monopoly patent protection would not produce 
constantly greater invention (I). The additional patent protection would produce no 
difference in market structure, but instead would simply substitute the inventor for an 
alternate natural monopolist. 
47 A lack of patent protection for abstract ideas may yield a less than optimal 
production of such ideas. However, allowing patents on such ideas would produce 
problems of defining the breadth of an idea and determining what constitutes “use” of the 
idea. See discussion, infra, section III.  
48 Recognition of this seems to have occurred. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
303 (1980); see also Metabolite, 548 U.S. 124, discussed infra. 
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mousetrap increases social utility by increasing invention, but an unlimited 
patent right on the mousetrap likely results in excessive deadweight loss. 
The Patent Act’s grant of strong patent protection for a limited time 
implicitly assumes that conditions conform to Figure 3a. 
In a world without information and transaction costs and with 
unlimited time each patent application would be evaluated to determine to 
which Figure it best corresponds. In the real world, however, these costs 
preclude matching each individual patent claim to its corresponding Figure. 
In other words, ideally the Patent Office would determine for each patent 
application whether the invention costs are large enough to need patent 
protection to be recouped, and if so, whether the benefit of the invention is 
greater than the deadweight loss from granting the patent. But in reality, 
undertaking this analysis on a patent-by-patent basis would be impossibly 
time and resource intensive.49 Moreover, even if there were sufficient time 
and resources, information asymmetries inherent in the process could make 
it impossible for the Patent Office to gather all of the relevant information 
that the applicant possesses in order to correctly determine whether a 
particular application should be granted.  
The above analysis shows that the most efficient patent regime is 
one that starts by determining initially, on a category-by-category basis, 
whether classes of inventions should be patentable. If so, then the other tests 
for patentability such as novelty, nonobviousness, and enablement/written 
description, that are set out in section 102, et seq. of the Patent Act should 
be applied.50 If not, then it is a waste of time and resources to engage in any 
of the tests set out in sections 102 et seq. of the Patent Act. And indeed, the 
Patent Act sets out the determination of subject matter patentability in 
section 101 of the Act as the very first step in determining the patentability 
of an invention or discovery.51 The following flowchart illustrates why 
these other tests for patentability cannot take the place of the subject matter 
patentability screen, and why it would be inefficient not to apply the subject 
matter patentability screen first.  
                                                 
49 Indeed, determining whether a proposed invention is novel is alone often too time 
intensive a task for the PTO to complete accurately. See Mandy B. Seuffert, Comments, 
Soft-Science Examiners at the USPTO: A Non-Obvious Solution to Reduce Erroneous 
Patent Grants, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 111-12 (2006) (“Because they lack the 
resources to both devote more time to individual applications and to conduct more 
thorough reviews, a number of patents may be issued in error.”). 
50 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112. 
51 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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This flowchart illustrates that if only the screens for patentability 
contained in section 102 et. seq. of the Patent Act are used to determine 
patentability, inventions that need no incentivization—that do not suffer 
from the public goods problem—will inefficiently be granted patents. In 
other words, once we get to section 102 of the Patent Act, we have already 
assumed that a public goods problem exists such that patents are needed to 
incentivize meritorious inventions within a field. But if no public goods 
problem exists, as is the case for, say, movie scripts, which are already 
incentivized by the existence of copyright, then no amount of screening for 
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novelty, non-obviousness, and enablement can make the granting of a 
patent efficient or necessary.52  
Thus, the critical first inquiry for the patentability of an invention 
should be whether the invention is within a subject matter area that is 
subject to a public goods problem such that absent patent protection an 
underproduction of inventions in that subject matter will result. If a public 
goods problem exists, then the subject matter should be patentable and the 
other tests for patentability should be applied. If no public goods problem 
exists, either because of the nature of the subject matter, or because other 
factors exist that adequately incentivize production of the public good, then 
subject matter patentability should be denied and the patentability inquiry 
should end. 
As will be described more fully in the next section, the traditional 
patent law regime implicitly recognized the efficiency of making 
categorical determinations about patentable subject matter first before 
continuing to the other screens for patentability. The traditional regime 
addressed this need through a systematic classification of inventions by 
subject matter. These classifications allowed patentability first to be decided 
on a class-by-class basis, rather than on an invention-by-invention basis. 
The traditional patent law regime implicitly matched each proposed subject 
matter class to its corresponding Figure. If a class corresponded to Figure 2, 
where deadweight loss (L) is always greater than additional invention (I), 
then all the inventions within that class received no patent protection.53 Of 
course, an individual invention within an unpatentable class may have been 
an exception and actually merited some patent protection. But if the 
information costs of correctly categorizing this invention outweigh the 
utility gained from patenting it, society is better off simply determining 
subject matter patentability on a broad class-by-class basis and leaving 
unpatentable those individual inventions that do not correspond to the rest 
of the class. When a class of inventions historically has been deemed to 
                                                 
52 Not that this stops some from enthusiastically endorsing patents on such things as 
storylines. See, e.g., Knight & Associates Home Page, http://www.plotpatents.com/. 
53 I am not suggesting that historically Congress and the courts went through this 
formal modeling when determining the patentability of various types of inventions. But as 
explained infra, such analysis seems to have occurred implicitly. The model set forth in this 
Article is an attempt to formalize the analysis of what should and should not be patentable 
subject matter. 
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merit some patent protection (i.e., when the class is deemed to correspond 
to Figure 3), each patent application has received additional attention. 54 
 
III. The Role of Courts in Excluding Inefficient Subject Matter 
A. The Courts’ Historical Classification of Unpatentable 
Subject Matter Based on Congress’s Delegation 
In this part of the Article I attempt to show two things. First, courts 
historically have served as gatekeepers making rough determinations, albeit 
in an informal, implicit, or intuitive manner, of whether invention in 
particular subject matter classes needed incentivization via patent grants. 
Second, I show the gradual process by which the federal courts abandoned 
their gatekeeping role.  
Historically the federal patent statutes have adopted broad language 
as to what types of inventions are patentable. In fact, the language of the 
various patent statutes has been so broad that one might think that virtually 
anything is patentable, so long as it meets the requirements of novelty, 
nonobviousness, and enablement. Such a broad reading of the statute would, 
however, make patentable even those classes of inventions where the 
deadweight loss of the patent grant exceeds increased invention. Implicitly 
recognizing this, the Supreme Court and federal courts have traditionally 
ruled certain classes of subject matter to be outside the patent statutes’ 
broad allowance of patentability. The oldest and most enduring of these 
exceptions to subject matter patentability are: laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.55 Moreover, courts historically have focused 
                                                 
54 Note that patent claims are given more or less coverage during the application 
process when the patentee typically negotiates with the patent examiner on the breadth of 
the claims that will be allowed and, therefore, implicitly, on the equivalents that will be 
covered by the patent. 
55 See, for example, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981), in which the Court 
stated that it “has undoubtedly recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery is not 
embraced within the statutory terms. Excluded from such patent protection are laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” (citations omitted). The Court went on to 
explain that “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a 
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.” 
Id. (citation omitted). The Court further explained that “[A] new mineral discovered in the 
earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein 
could not patent his celebrated law that E = mc 2; nor could Newton have patented the law 
of gravity. Such discoveries are ‘manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.’ ” Id. (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) 
(quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., at 130)). 
(Continued…) 
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on a variety of tests for subject matter patentability that, either intentionally 
or felicitously, managed to exclude classes of subject matter for which 
deadweight loss of patentability likely exceeded increased invention.  
Congress traditionally has recognized the value of the patent 
common law created by the federal courts. Accordingly, Congress has 
worded the patent acts broadly, so as to continue to give discretion to courts 
in determining subject matter patentability. The current Patent Act, passed 
in 1952, is no exception. In the 1952 Act, Congress kept the definition of 
patentable subject matter very general.56 Congress did not overturn or 
narrow any of the judicially created law regarding patentable subject matter. 
All that Congress did was change the term “art” to “process” and define 
“process” as either “process or method,” which definitions were in keeping 
with judicial decisions.57 Nothing in the 1952 Patent Act indicated that 
Congress intended the courts to change their patent common law making 
roles or stop performing their function as gatekeepers of subject matter 
patentability. 
B. Judicial Tests For Patentable Subject Matter 
The difficulty in determining the dividing line between efficiently 
incentivizing invention and causing excessive deadweight loss from the 
                                                 
Note that wrapped up in the Court’s holdings that these areas are not properly subject 
to patent protection under section 101 may be practical problems regarding deciding the 
novelty of discoveries in such areas (§ 102), or in describing or enabling discoveries in 
these areas (§ 112). 
56 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”). 
57 See S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2398-99: 
The present law states that any person who has invented or discovered 
any “new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter 
. . . may obtain a patent.” That language has been preserved except that 
the word “art” . . . has been changed to the word “process.” “Art” in this 
place in the present statute has a different meaning than the words 
“useful art” in the Constitution, and a different meaning than the use of 
the word “art” in other places in the statutes, and it is interpreted by the 
courts to be practically synonymous with process or method. The word 
“process” has been used to avoid the necessity of explanation that the 
word “art” as used in this place means “process or method,” . . . The 
definition of “process” has been added in section 100 to make it clear that 
“process or method” is meant, and also to clarify the present law as to the 
patentability of certain types of processes or methods as to which some 
insubstantial doubts have been expressed.) (emphasis added). 
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patent monopoly has caused courts to create and reject a number of different 
tests. The physical transformation test, the mathematical algorithm 
exception, the mental steps doctrine, and the business method exception are 
some of the many tests that courts have created for this purpose. I will 
review these four tests that help distinguish, albeit not explicitly, efficient 
from inefficient subject matter for patentability as well as, sometimes, 
patentable process from abstract idea. A review of the ways the Supreme 
Court and Federal Circuit have developed and discarded these tests gives 
insight into how the courts eventually rejected their roles as determiners of 
efficient subject matter for patentability and threw open the gates for the 
patentability of business methods and virtually everything else. 
1. The Rise and Fall of the Physical Transformation 
Test, the Mental Steps Doctrine, and the 
Mathematical Algorithm Exception 
The physical transformation test58 served courts well over the years 
as a test that excluded classes of subject matter for which the deadweight 
loss of monopoly exceeded increased invention. This test functioned by 
asking a simple question about processes for which patents were sought: 
Does the process achieve a physical transformation of something in the 
material world?59 If so, then the invention was the type of subject matter that 
was patentable, and further inquiry into novelty, nonobviousness, 
enablement, etc., would proceed. If not, the court held the process to be 
unpatentable, and the inquiry ended. Conducting this test at the initial 
subject matter level served both to prevent the patenting of inventions or 
discoveries for which deadweight loss was likely to outweigh increased 
invention, and to determine which inventions were of a sort that was worthy 
of further examination for patentability. In other words, the initial subject 
matter patentability test in the form of the physical transformation test 
                                                 
58 The physical transformation test overlaps with, and may, for practical purposes, be 
identical to the “mental steps” doctrine, which traditionally held that processes involving 
mental steps are not patentable. See, e.g., In Re Heritage, 150 F.2d 554, 556-58 (C.C.P.A. 
1945). 
59 The Supreme Court began to sketch out the physical transformation test in Dolbear 
v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. (The Telephone Cases), 126 U.S. 1 (1888). There the Court was 
confronted with Alexander Graham Bell’s claim for the use of electric current to transmit 
vocal or other sounds. In upholding the patent, the Court stressed that the patent did not 
cover “the use of electricity distinct from the particular process with which it is connected 
in his patent.” Id. at 535. The Court distinguished between the idea of using electricity as a 
motive power—which idea was not patentable—and claims for particular processes using 
electricity to accomplish specified physical objectives. 
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served to quickly exclude entire classes of invention and to save the Patent 
Office time and resources. 
The physical transformation test was particularly effective at 
separating out inefficient subject matter classes in the pre-information age 
during which economically valuable inventions mainly concerned 
mechanical devices and processes rather than, say, software or information. 
At the time, most economically valuable processes were those that 
accomplished physical results. Moreover, the perfection of such mechanical 
and chemical processes generally required sustained research and 
investment of time and resources. Accordingly, allowing a patent on 
processes that affected physical transformation incentivized such 
invention.60 Drawing the line at physically transformative processes served 
to cabin the patent within a reasonably narrow zone, so that future invention 
was not discouraged and the amount of deadweight loss from monopoly 
was minimized.61 Requiring inventors to state their inventions in the form of 
a patent for something forced inventors to tie their processes to certain and 
definite physical activity, and thus left the abstract process unclaimed and 
free of patent protection.62 
                                                 
60 Thus, the Court allowed the patenting of processes that accomplished physical 
transformations of materials, but did not allow patents on processes that did not achieve 
physical transformations. See, e.g., Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) (“A 
process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or 
a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a 
different state or thing.”). 
61 See Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (“In Corning v. Burden, [56 U.S.] (15 How.) 252, 267-
68 (1853), the Court said, ‘One may discover a new and useful improvement in the process 
of tanning, dyeing, etc., irrespective of any particular form of machinery or mechanical 
device.’ The examples given were the ‘arts of tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, 
vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores.’ Id. at 267. Those are instances, however, where 
the use of chemical substances or physical acts, such as temperature control, changes 
articles or materials. The chemical process or the physical acts which transform the raw 
material are, however, sufficiently definite to confine the patent monopoly within rather 
definite bounds.”) 
62 Thus, an inventor who discovered a new method of refining flour was not allowed 
to patent the use of currents of air to remove impurities, but rather was forced to claim the 
use of air currents as part of an overall process for refining flour. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 
U.S. 780, 785-86 (1876). This left the abstract process open for incorporation and use by 
others, yet gave enough protection to the inventor to incentivize his invention and 
disclosure in the form of a patent. The inventor in such a case gained protection from 
others who might wish to appropriate the process in the iron smelting industry, but did not 
achieve monopoly over all potential adaptations and incorporations of his process. Of 
course, an inventor might have been able to claim his invention more broadly (depending 
(Continued…) 
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The physical transformation test began to erode as the use of 
computers in business and industry became widespread. As patent claims 
moved from processes that mixed particular substances together to produce 
a new tangible product to processes that used programmable computers to 
monitor timing or temperature in industrial processes, courts were faced 
with new challenges in determining where the physical transformation line 
lay, and what exactly should constitute a patentable physical transformation. 
63 
As courts continued to wrestle with this line-drawing dilemma, a 
1966 Presidential Commission on the Patent System concluded that 
software should not be patentable.64 In making its recommendation, the 
Commission analyzed whether the costs of the patent system needed to be 
incurred in order to stimulate invention in the software field, then in its 
infancy. The Commission concluded that they did not, noting “the creation 
of programs has undergone substantial and satisfactory growth in the 
                                                 
on the prior art), such that he could have claimed a process for refining a metal, or perhaps 
even a process for refining a substance. Even such broad claims still serve to cabin the 
patent right, however, because they still tie the use of the process to refining something. 
Thus, a novel adaptation of the process to, for instance, more homogenously mix materials 
would not be prohibited by the patent grant. 
63 It is important to note that this problem arose from increasing difficulty in drawing 
lines as to physical transformation, rather than from a sense that software or information-
based processes were not being adequately incentivized without patent protection. The 
physical transformation test began to unravel once the PTO was faced with patent 
applications for machines that included software that controlled the machine’s 
manufacturing processes. See infra. In these cases, the software was given patent protection 
as part of the machine, even though software on its own still resided outside the boundary 
of patentable subject matter. New problems arose when patent applications began claiming 
software that merely affected the inside of a computer. In such cases it was harder to 
distinguish a physical transformation of the abstract ideas/processes embodied in the 
software. This problem worried courts throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Any position taken 
by the Court other than one in favor of the patentability of software was problematic, since 
the same functionality often could be achieved by changing a system’s hardware, which 
was unarguably patentable under the law of the day. Thus it seemed that disallowing 
software patents would cause a senseless division in the kinds of computer innovation that 
received patent protection. Chisum, et al., describe the problem this way: “If a mechanical 
device is patentable subject matter, then why not an electronic device like computer 
hardware? And if hardware is patentable subject matter, then why not a general purpose 
piece of hardware programmed for a specific purpose? And for that matter, why not 
software?” CHISUM, ET. AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 754 (1st ed. 1998). 
64 UNITED STATES, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS IN AN AGE OF 
EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT 
SYSTEM (1966). 
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absence of patent protection and that copyright protection for programs is 
presently available.”65 The Commission also recommended that the line-
drawing problems regarding software should be resolved against patentees 
and that neither software nor computers programmed in a specified manner 
should be allowable subject matter.66 
At roughly the same time, the PTO published new examination 
guidelines that were designed to disallow software patents and maintain the 
physical transformation test that had functioned so efficiently for so long.67 
The proposed guidelines deemed a computer program by itself, whether 
claimed as an apparatus or a process, unpatentable subject matter.68 The 
PTO formally adopted the guidelines in 1968, noting, however, that a 
programmed computer could be part of a patentable process if the process 
was otherwise nonobvious and produced a physical result.69 
The conclusions of the President’s Commission and the PTO 
guidelines were well supported by the patent law decisions of the day. 
                                                 
65 Id. at 13. 
66 The Commision stated:  
Uncertainty now exists as to whether the statute permits a valid patent to 
be granted on programs. Direct attempts to patent programs have been 
rejected on the ground of nonstatutory subject matter. Indirect attempts to 
obtain patents and avoid the rejection, by drafting claims as a process, or 
a machine or components thereof programmed in a given manner, rather 
than as a program itself, have confused the issue further and should not 
be permitted.  
Id. The Commission also pointed out and predicted the problems with adequately 
examining software patents given the lack of prior art files and the prodigious amounts of 
new software being created all the time: 
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs 
because of a lack of a classification technique and the requisite search 
files. Even if these were available, reliable searches would not be feasible 
or economic because of the tremendous volume of prior art being 
generated. Without this search, the patenting of programs would be 
tantamount to mere registration and the presumption of validity would be 
all but nonexistent. 
Id. Note that the problems the Commission warned about with regard to the 
inadequacy of prior art search capability at the PTO for software appear to have been well-
founded and apply with at least equal force to business method patents.  
67 829 Off. Gaz. Pat. Off. 865 (Aug. 16, 1966). 
68 These guidelines were based on the “mental steps doctrine” and on the definition of 
“process” given in Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876); see also Examination of 
Patent Applications on Computer Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 15609 (Oct. 22, 1968). 
69 See Examination of Patent Applications on Computer Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 
15609. 
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Specifically, the “mental steps” doctrine, a variation on the “physical 
transformation” test, attempted to draw the line between patentable 
processes and abstract ideas by denying patentability to inventions 
consisting mainly of mathematical formulas, methods of computation, or 
other mental operations.70 The mental steps doctrine served the same 
function as the physical transformation test in that it prohibited patents for 
subject matter for which the deadweight loss of the patent monopoly was 
likely to outweigh the incentive to invent. First, the mental steps doctrine 
protected against excessive deadweight loss by not allowing patents on 
abstract formulas or mental steps.71 Second, the doctrine prevented patents 
on known methods to which some mental step had been added.72 Third, the 
doctrine implicitly acknowledged that less incentive was needed to 
encourage the invention of processes of mental steps or the discovery of 
new mathematical formulas than was needed to encourage the invention of 
new industrial processes. Simply put, the material resources needed to 
invent a mental process are low, while the materials required to design and 
test a new industrial process could be considerable. Accordingly, it made 
sense to incentivize invention of physically transforming processes via the 
patent grant, while leaving mental processes unpatentable.  
Notwithstanding the above, in 1968—the very year in which the 
Presidential Commission and the PTO urged the rejection of software 
patents—the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)73 rejected the 
mental steps doctrine in In re Prater.74 The CCPA did not engage in an 
                                                 
70 See, e.g., In re Heritage, 150 F.2d at 556-58 (C.C.P.A. 1945); In re Shao Wen Yuan, 
188 F.2d 377 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Bolongaro, 62 F.2d 1059, 1060 (C.C.P.A. 1933). 
71 A patent on a formula itself might have costs in terms of deadweight loss far in 
excess of the incentive it provided to derive such formulas.  
72 For example, a person could not patent a known method of catalyzation simply by 
adding a computer program that used an algorithm to continuously update the alarm limits 
for the process. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
73 The CCPA was the predecessor court to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The 
CCPA was given jurisdiction over appeals of patentability from the Patent and Trademark 
Office. In 1982 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created with jurisdiction 
over all appeals from the PTO and also from all patent claims raised by plaintiffs in any 
district court (the Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction over patent claims raised as 
defenses). 28 U.S.C. § 41. 
74 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), modified on reh’g, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
In Prater, the claim was for an improved process for analyzing spectrographic data. The 
claimant used an analog computer to calculate mathematical formulas that he had come up 
with in order to obtain the best results. The patent application gave an analog computer as 
the preferred embodiment, but stated that a programmed digital computer would also work. 
(Continued…) 
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analysis of the efficiency of granting patents to inventions involving mental 
steps. Rather, the CCPA engaged in a formal textual analysis of the patent 
statute, largely abandoning the role the federal courts had traditionally 
occupied as shapers of the federal patent common law. The CCPA held that 
the precedent that the mental steps doctrine depended upon had either been 
inadequately reasoned or simply misinterpreted over the years. The court 
held that just because a process may be done mentally (as is possible with 
the derivation or application of a formula), it should not be barred from 
patent protection if the same process could, in the alternative, be 
accomplished by another mechanism, such as a programmed computer.75  
The CCPA went further two years later in In re Musgrave,76 when it 
announced that any process containing a sequence of operational steps was 
patentable under section 101 so long as it was within the “technological 
arts.”77 The next year, in In re Benson,78 the CCPA allowed the patenting of 
software generally by holding that computers are within the “technological 
arts” for purposes of section 101, regardless of the use to which they are 
put.79 
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari of Benson and reversed. The 
claimants in Benson claimed a method for converting binary-coded decimal 
(BCD) numerals into the pure binary numerals used as the basic language of 
computers. The respondents apparently had varied the order of steps for the 
conversion from the usual order that a human would use to accomplish the 
                                                 
The Patent Office previously had rejected the process claims based on the mental-steps 
doctrine. It found that the only novel part of the process was the discovery of an 
unpatentable mathematical principle. It also rejected the apparatus claim, holding that once 
the mathematical formula was held to be within the prior art, there was no patentable part 
of the apparatus. See id. at 1379-81.  
75 Id. at 1389.  
76 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
77 Id. at 893. Note that the majority opinion in Musgrave used the term “technological 
arts” without ever defining it. Judge Baldwin, in a concurring opinion, criticized this new 
and indefinite test for patentability. Id. at 895 (“First and foremost will be the problem of 
interpreting the meaning of ‘technological arts’: Is this term intended to be synonymous 
with the ‘industrial technology’-- mentioned by Judge Smith? It sounds broader to me. 
Necessarily, this will have to be considered a question of law and decided on a case-by-
case basis. Promulgation of any all-encompassing definition has to be impossible.”) 
78 441 F. 2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
79 Note that patent protection has been broadened even further subsequently due to the 
PTO’s complete rejection of the “technological arts” limitation for patentability. See, e.g., 
Ex parte Lundgren, No. 2003-2088, at 4 (B.P.A.I. 2005), discussed infra. 
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conversion, but the results were the same.80 Faced with such a broad claim 
for a method of solving a mathematical problem, the Court held that the 
claims were outside of patentable subject matter because they amounted to a 
patent on the algorithm itself: 
Here the “process” claim is so abstract and sweeping as to 
cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure 
binary conversion. The end use may (1) vary from the 
operation of a train to verification of drivers’ licenses to 
researching the law books for precedents and (2) be 
performed through any existing machinery or future-devised 
machinery or without any apparatus.81  
Thus, the Court used the mathematical algorithm exception to 
exclude subject matter (algorithms not tied to particular uses) the patenting 
of which would cause much more deadweight loss than necessary to 
incentivize the invention.82  
                                                 
80 The Supreme Court, unlike the CCPA, did not engage in a formalistic interpretation 
of the bare patent statute. Rather, the Court implicitly analyzed the monopoly cost of the 
patent by examining the breadth and preclusive effect the patent would have. The Court 
noted that the patentee claimed his method of numeric conversion without limiting it “to 
any particular art or technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any 
particular end use.” Benson, 409 U.S. at 64. The claims “purported to cover any use of the 
claimed method in a general purpose digital computer of any type.” Id. In other words, the 
claims were tied to no physical transformation. Nor were they tied to a particular use within 
a program or computer. The patentee sought rights over the numeric conversion method 
generally. 
81 Id. at 68.  
82 The Court stated its holding “in a nutshell” as the following:  
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that 
would be the result if the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure 
binary numerals were patented in this case. The mathematical formula 
involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection 
with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, 
the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical 
effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself. 
Id. at 71-72. The Court here may have been conflating claim scope with patentable subject 
matter, at least to some extent. But allowing excessively broad ranges of patentable subject 
matter necessarily allows broader claim scope. If, for instance, patents on processes not 
linked to any physical apparatus or transformation are allowed as patentable subject matter, 
then the scope of such patents’ claims will obviously be very broad. Further, even if the 
scope of the claim here were limited somehow, such as to computers, the increased 
incentive to innovate that this would give would likely be dwarfed by the deadweight loss 
that would occur if the discoverer could claim ownership of all uses of the algorithm itself, 
(Continued…) 
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It is notable that the Court did not simply apply the physical 
transformation test, however, instead the Court retreated somewhat from 
that test, stating,  
It is argued that a process must either be tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or 
materials to a “different state or thing.” We do not hold that 
no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the 
requirements of our prior precedents. It is said that the 
decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a 
computer. We do not so hold.83 
In so doing the Court implicitly acknowledged that it is not the physical 
transformation test per se that is needed, but rather that the test thus far had 
served the efficient and prudential purpose of precluding classes of 
inventions from patentability for which a patent grant would be inefficient.  
Just six years later, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of the 
patentability of algorithms in Parker v. Flook.84 The claimant in Flook 
sought to patent a method that utilized a mathematical algorithm to 
continuously update alarm limits (safety limits) for a catalyzing process. 
The claimant used a computer in his machine to continuously do the math to 
change the alarm limits. The Court recognized that in order to determine the 
patentability of the process in Flook it again had to distinguish between 
patentable processes and abstract ideas. The Court said: “The line between a 
patentable ‘process’ and an unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always clear. 
Both are ‘conception[s] of the mind, seen only by [their] effects when being 
executed or performed.’”85  
The Court in Flook decided to draw the line of patentability well 
away from the unpatentable principle side of the spectrum by treating all 
mathematical algorithms as unpatentable subject matter. Since defining the 
parameters of the mathematical algorithm exception had been difficult for 
courts in the past, Flook provided an opportunity to stake out new, firmer 
boundaries. The Court wrote, “[w]e use the word ‘algorithm’ in this case, as 
                                                 
even if the uses are limited to computers. As the Court said, this seems the only practical 
medium in which to utilize the formula anyway.  
But note that claim 8 of the Patent in Benson discusses “shift register[s],” which seem 
to at least tie this claim to a particular way of implementing the process on a computer. Id. 
at 73-74 (Appendix). Claim 13, however, was not limited to shift registers. Id. 
83 Id. at 71. 
84 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
85 Id. at 589 (quoting Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880)). 
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we did in Gottschalk v. Benson, to mean ‘[a] procedure for solving a given 
type of mathematical problem ….’”86 The Court clearly equated these types 
of procedures for solving mathematical problems with unpatentable “laws 
of nature,”87 and held that process claims containing mathematical 
algorithms must be tested for subject matter patentability in two steps.88 The 
first step was to assume the mathematical algorithm was part of the prior 
art, even if it was novel and nonobvious.89 The second step was to examine 
                                                 
86 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585 n.1 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Gottschalk 
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972)). 
87 Id. at 589. 
88 The Court held that whether claims were drafted as process claims or machine 
claims was not determinative, because if it were, clever drafting could determine 
patentability. The Court instead held that claims that were novel only because of inclusion 
of an algorithm could not be patented. In its description of algorithms the Court equated 
algorithms directly to laws of nature: 
First, respondent incorrectly assumes that if a process application 
implements a principle in some specific fashion, it automatically falls 
within the patentable subject matter of . . . § 101 and the substantive 
patentability of the particular process can then be determined by the 
conditions of §§ 102 and 103. This assumption is based on respondent’s 
narrow reading of Benson, and is as untenable in the context of § 101 as 
it is in the context of that case. It would make the determination of 
patentable subject matter depend simply on the draftsman’s art and 
would ill serve the principles underlying the prohibition against patents 
for “ideas” or phenomena of nature. The rule that the discovery of a law 
of nature cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural 
phenomena are not processes, but rather on the more fundamental 
understanding that they are not the kind of “discoveries” that the statute 
was enacted to protect. The obligation to determine what type of 
discovery is sought to be patented must precede the determination of 
whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious. 
Id. at 593. 
Here the Court discusses the efficiency of conducting a first screen to exclude certain 
inefficient classes of inventions before engaging in the more time and labor-intensive tasks 
of examining novelty and nonobviousness of the intention. 
89 See id. at 591. The Court claimed that its prior precedence led to the two-part test: 
MacKay Radio and Funk Bros. point to the proper analysis for this case: 
The process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be new 
and useful. Indeed, the novelty of the mathematical algorithm is not a 
determining factor at all. Whether the algorithm was in fact known or 
unknown at the time of the claimed invention, as one of the “basic tools 
of scientific and technological work,” see Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S., at 67, it is treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art. 
(Continued…) 
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the process as a whole to determine whether, once the algorithm was 
assumed to be part of the prior art, the process contained a patentable 
invention. The Court in Flook held that the claimant failed the test.90 
Here the court was saying that because the discovery or design of 
algorithms is not the sort of thing it is efficient to incentivize by means of 
the patent grant, no patent on the algorithm is available. Nevertheless, as 
with all inventions, if aside from the unpatentable subject matter there is 
something that makes the remaining subject matter novel and nonobvious, 
then a patent may be had. 
Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist, dissented in Flook, arguing that the majority was smuggling in 
the novelty and inventiveness requirements of sections 102 and 103 to the 
consideration of statutory subject matter under section 101.91 What the 
dissent did not realize, however, is that making a quick analysis to 
determine subject matter patentability is quite different than doing a 
fulsome novelty analysis. The majority’s rule allowed courts and examiners 
to efficiently say that inventions in certain classes of subject matter were 
not patentable—in this case, algorithms—and quickly move on to analyze 
whether the patentable subject matter part of a claim was novel and 
nonobvious, and therefore patentable. 
                                                 
Id. at 591-92. Here again the Court is asserting that the discovery of the algorithm is not the 
sort of thing to be incentivized by the patent system. Rather, it is inventive uses of 
algorithms that should be incentivized by the patent grant. Discovery of algorithms, the 
Court is therefore saying, is not the sort of thing for which the gain to invention of allowing 
patents is likely to exceed the deadweight loss of the patent monopoly.  
90 The Court held: 
Respondent’s process is unpatentable under § 101, not because it contains a 
mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to 
be within the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable 
invention. Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be well 
known, an inventive application of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the 
discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other 
inventive concept in its application. 
Id. 
91 Justice Stewart wrote: 
Indeed, I suppose that thousands of processes and combinations have 
been patented that contained one or more steps or elements that 
themselves would have been unpatentable subject matter. Eibel Process 
Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, is a case in point. 
There the Court upheld the validity of an improvement patent that made 
use of the law of gravity, which by itself was clearly unpatentable. 
Id. at 599-600 
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A sea change began in 1980. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,92 the 
Supreme Court extended patent protection to a living organism—a man-
made bacteria capable of breaking down crude oil and thus useful in treating 
oil spills. Although the long-held rule against the patentability of living 
things had been economically efficient in the past, the court in Chakrabarty 
recognized that biotechnology changed things. In the past, a patent sought 
on a living thing would have been for an organism that was discovered in 
nature. Thus, prior to the biotechnology industry, living organisms were 
discoveries that correspond to Figure 3, supra Part II.B.2, for which 
patenting would cause more deadweight loss than increased invention or 
discovery. With the advent of bioengineered organisms, however, the 
calculus changed. As the record in Chakrabarty made clear, a great deal of 
time, effort, and experiment were necessary to produce the man-made oil-
eating bacteria.93 Accordingly, if invention in the field was to be 
encouraged, patent protection was necessary. And indeed, when it comes to 
patents for engineered organisms, the deadweight loss is much less than for 
discovered organisms because no use of a naturally occurring organism is 
thereby precluded by the patent.94  
Unfortunately, however, the Court went beyond this efficiency 
analysis. Rather than simply expanding subject matter patentability 
piecemeal, as economic efficiency dictates, the Court followed suit with the 
CCPA and largely abandoned its common lawmaking role in the area of 
patent law. Thus, the Court announced that its decision was based on a bare 
                                                 
92 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
93 Id. 
94 The Court recognized this difference between engineered and discovered organisms 
and held: 
The patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for 
significant utility. His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; 
accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101. 
Id. at 310. The Court was careful to distinguish the labor and capital-intensive human-
engineered bacteria from those organisms that are merely discovered: 
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every 
discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas 
have been held not patentable. Thus, a new mineral discovered in the 
earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.  
Id. at 309. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)) 
(internal citations omitted.) 
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textual reading of the Patent Act.95 Rather than continue to wrestle with 
issues of how to draw lines on physical transformation, mental steps, and 
what types of living organisms should receive patent protection, the Court 
largely abandoned any gatekeeping role and stated that courts “should not 
read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has 
not expressed.”96 The Court then announced that Congress had meant 
patentable subject matter to “include anything under the sun that is made by 
man.”97  
The problem with this abdication of subject matter patentability 
analysis is that under a bare textual reading of the Patent Act, it is no longer 
apparent why even the traditionally off-limit subject matters should not be 
patentable. Even though the Court in Chakrabarty asserted that abstract 
ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomenon remain unpatentable subject 
matter, there is no textual basis for this exception.98  
The second case signaling the Supreme Court’s abandonment of a 
subject matter gatekeeping role came in the 1981 case of Diamond v. 
Diehr.99 The Court’s holding there is diametrically opposed to its holding in 
Flook, notwithstanding the two cases’ strikingly similar facts. The claimant 
in Diehr sought a patent for a process for curing synthetic rubber that 
included the use of a well-known mathematical formula and a programmed 
digital computer. Although there was some wrangling over whether the 
method of continuously measuring the curing temperature was new, in the 
end it appears that the only novel element of the process was the use of a 
programmed digital computer that received information on the temperature 
as the rubber cured and, by repeatedly solving the appropriate mathematical 
                                                 
95 Id, at 307 (characterizing the decision as “a narrow one of statutory interpretation 
requiring us to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”) 
96 Id. at 308 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 
(1933)). 
97 Id. at 309 (citing the Committee Reports, S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 
(1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952); Testimony of P.J. Federico, 
Hearings on H.R. 3760 before subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1951)). 
98 See 35 US.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”) Under this bare text, there is no reason to exclude new and useful discoveries or 
inventions of abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomenon from patentability. An 
abstract idea can surely be a new and useful process, just as a law of nature can be. And a 
natural phenomenon can surely be a composition of matter. 
99 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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formula, adjusted the timer that opened and closed the mold to achieve a 
more perfect cure then had previously been possible.100 
Justice Rehnquist distinguished Flook by saying that the application 
in Flook had only “sought to protect a formula for computing [an alarm 
limit],”101 while the claim in Diehr was “for a process of curing synthetic 
rubber.”102 This rather weak distinction showed that the tide had turned 
toward increased patentability of non-physical processes and computer 
programs.  
The Federal Circuit (which succeeded the CCPA)103 took its cue 
from the Supreme Court’s change of direction and continued to expand the 
scope of patentable subject matter by adopting the Court’s bare textualist 
reading of the Patent Act and not performing any separate efficiency 
                                                 
100 Justice Stevens pointed out that the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals 
expressly found that the only difference between the claimed method and traditional 
methods of rubber curing was the constant recalculating of the time the mold should be 
closed. Id. These findings were not disturbed by the CCPA. 
101 Id. at 186 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 586 at 586 (1978)). 
102 Id. at 176. 
103 Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982. Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49). The formation of the Federal Circuit did not change the path the 
federal courts were on towards an abandonment of the patentable subject matter gatekeeper 
role, but Congress’s concurrent consolidation and assignment of patent appeals to the 
Federal Circuit, id., likely sped the abandonment of the gatekeeper role because there were 
no longer a number of circuit courts to debate and disagree about the patentability of 
various subject matter. Once the Federal Circuit embraced ever expanding subject matter 
patentability there were no other circuit courts to disagree and stir debate.  
In addition, the Federal Circuit has often been accused of a pro patent bias. See, e.g., 
Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious Preponderance,” 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 928 (2004) (“The generally received wisdom [is] that the 
Federal Circuit adopted a pro-patent bias early in its tenure.”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-
Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 380 (2001) (“the Federal Circuit 
has taken its role as defender of the patent system seriously. In pursuit of that perceived 
role, the Federal Circuit has at times shown a reckless indifference to its sworn duty to 
‘uphold the law,’ which presumably includes following the binding precedent of the 
[Supreme] Court even where (or perhaps, especially where) certain members of the Federal 
Circuit believe the [Supreme] Court is wrong.”) (footnote omitted); Robert P. Merges, 
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. 
L. REV. 803, 822 (1988) (“the Federal Circuit appears to be a ‘pro-patent’ court.”). 
Moreover, until lately the Supreme Court has not often granted certiorari of patent 
cases. The Supreme Court has not been required to decide patent law issues arising from 
circuit splits, but instead only seems to accept certiorari of patent cases if it thinks that 
changes may need to be made to the Federal Circuit’s case law.  
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analysis gate-keeping as to subject matter patentability. Thus, in 1992, in 
Arrhythmia Research v. Corazonix,104 the Federal Circuit found valid a 
patent on a method of converting the signal from an electrocardiogram 
machine into a different visual image that could be used to help determine 
ventricular tachycardia. The process used a mathematical formula and a 
programmed computer, although the claims stated that hard-wired logic 
circuitry could be used. In deciding Arrhythmia Research, the Federal 
Circuit asserted that Congress had never meant to exclude algorithms from 
patentability.105 
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit did not entirely abandon the 
requirement that a process do something physical to be patentable, however. 
Instead it held that the “claimed steps of ‘converting’, ‘applying’, 
‘determining’, and ‘comparing’ are physical process steps that transform 
one physical, electrical signal into another. The view that ‘there is nothing 
necessarily physical about “signals” is incorrect.’”106 The Federal Circuit 
then adopted its own two-step procedure for determining unpatentable 
algorithms, which de-emphasized the physical transformation 
requirement.107 
In the case of In re Alappat,108 the Federal Circuit further expanded 
the patentability of algorithms. It held that “the proper inquiry in dealing 
with the so called mathematical subject matter exception to §101 … is to 
see whether the claimed subject matter as a whole is a disembodied 
mathematical concept ….”109 The concurring and dissenting opinion of 
Chief Judge Archer and the concurring opinion of Judge Rader made it 
clear that they thought that only abstract mathematical formulas should be 
denied patentable subject matter status, and that applications of 
                                                 
104 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
105 Id. at 1064 (“Indeed Congress has never stated that section 101’s term ‘process’ 
excludes certain types of algorithms. Therefore, as Diehr commands, this court should 
refrain from employing judicially-created tests to limit section 101.”) 
106 Id. at 1059 (quoting In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 790 (CCPA 1982)). 
107 The court described its new test as follows: 
First, the claim is analyzed to determine whether a mathematical 
algorithm is directly or indirectly recited. Next, if a mathematical 
algorithm is found, the claim as a whole is further analyzed to determine 
whether the algorithm is “applied in any manner to physical elements or 
process steps,” and, if it is, it “passes muster under § 101.” 
Id. at 1063. 
108 33 F. 3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
109 Id. at 1544 (emphasis added). 
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mathematical formulas should always be patentable.110 Judge Rader thought 
that this approach was especially justified by the fact that “the line of 
demarcation between a dedicated circuit and a computer algorithm 
accomplishing the identical task is frequently blurred and is becoming 
increasingly so as the technology develops. In this field a software process 
is often interchangeable with a hardware circuit.”111 
Thus by the time business method patents reached the Federal 
Circuit, the court’s jurisprudence had all but reached the point at which any 
applied use of an abstract idea was patentable. This broadening of subject 
matter patentability with regard to software algorithms made it difficult for 
the Federal Circuit to uphold the business method exception or the physical 
transformation test as viable exceptions to patentability. And indeed, those 
tests have now all been laid by the wayside by Federal Circuit decisions.  
                                                 
110 Chief Judge Archer stated: 
The dispositive issue is whether the invention or discovery for which an 
award of patent is sought is more than just a discovery in abstract 
mathematics. Where the invention or discovery is only of mathematics, 
the invention or discovery is not the “kind” of discovery the patent law 
was designed to protect and even the most narrowly drawn claim must 
fail. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 n. 14. To come within the purview of § 101 
and the patent law, a mathematical formula or operation must be “applied 
in an invention of a type set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101.”  
Id. at 1557 (quoting Meyer, 688 F.2d at 795) (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
111 Id. at 1583 (Rader, J., concurring). Judge Rader’s concurring opinion was even 
more expansive of patentability: 
In the wake of Diehr and Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court only denies 
patentable subject matter status to algorithms which are, in fact, simply 
laws of nature. . . . 
The limits on patentable subject matter within section 101 do not depend 
on whether an invention can be expressed as a mathematical relationship 
or algorithm. Mathematics is simply a form of expression—a language. 
Id. at 1582 (Rader, J., concurring). 
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2. The Business Method Exception and Its Undoing 
The first thing to understand about the business method exception112 
is that for all of its efficiency in excluding business methods from 
patentability, it was always an exception based on dicta. For most of this 
century, Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.113 was cited as the 
case that made business methods unpatentable per se.114 But the court in 
Hotel Security never held this. The patent at issue in Hotel Security was for 
a method of keeping track of the food waiters were taking to tables in order 
to verify that the waiters were giving the full cost of each meal to the 
hotel.115  
The Second Circuit disallowed the patent, but, contrary to 
subsequent popular belief, it did not hold that business methods are outside 
of the subject matter that can be awarded process patents. Instead, the court 
                                                 
112 The phrases “business method exception” and “business method patents” raise the 
question of what, exactly, is a business method, and how is it distinguished from other 
processes. Unfortunately, there is not a clear answer to the question, especially when it 
comes to software related to conducting business, like the software at issue in State St. 
Bank. The United States Patent & Trademark Office sets out Class 705 for patents that 
claim “machines and their corresponding methods for performing data processing 
operations . . . utilized in 1) practice, administration, or management of an enterprise, or 2) 
processing of financial data, or 3) determination of the charge for goods or services.” U.S. 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE WHITE PAPER ON AUTOMATED FINANCIAL OR 
MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS) (hereafter “PTO 
BUSINESS METHODS WHITE PAPER”) (2000), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/whitepaper.pdf. Drawing the line between 
business methods on the one hand and software processes, on the other, can be particularly 
difficult when it comes to on-line businesses or processes. For example, Amazon’s 1-Click 
patent describes a method of allowing customers to place orders for merchandise over the 
Internet. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sep. 12, 1997). 
113 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). 
114 See, e.g., Rinaldo Del Gallo, III, Are “Methods of Doing Business” Finally Out of 
Business as a Statutory Rejection?, 38 IDEA 403, 408-409 (1998). 
115 Id. at 467. The method involved assigning each waiter a number, and having the 
head waiter keep track of the food each waiter took from the kitchen. The waiters were also 
given slips of paper with their numbers on the paper, and they returned these, along with 
the payment for each meal, to the head cashier when the customer paid for his meal. By 
comparing the head waiter’s list of food each waiter took from the kitchen with the slips 
and amounts each waiter gave to the head cashier, the hotel could discern when a waiter 
failed to pay the hotel the cost of all the meals he served to dining room customers. Id. 
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held that the “invention” was not new and useful.116 The court said: “The 
fundamental principle of the system is as old as the art of bookkeeping, i.e. 
charging the goods of the employer to the agent who takes them.”117 The 
court went on to say in dicta that “[i]f at the time of [the inventor’s] 
application, there had been no system of bookkeeping of any kind in 
restaurants, we would be confronted with the question whether a new and 
useful system of cash-registering and account-checking is such an art as is 
patentable under the statute.”118  
The court specifically left the question open to future cases. But for 
nearly ninety years it was believed that the answer to the question was 
negative because of one oft-quoted passage:  
A system of transacting business disconnected from the 
means for carrying out the system is not, with the most 
liberal interpretation of the term, an art. Advice is not 
patentable. . . . No mere abstraction, no idea, however 
brilliant, can be the subject of a patent irrespective of the 
means designed to give it effect.119 
Although this statement was dicta, it showed that the court was quite 
comfortable weighing in and judging patents on business methods to be 
inefficient and unneeded. 120 
                                                 
116 See id. at 469 (the Court held that “[i]t cannot be maintained that the physical 
means described by [the inventor],—the sheet and slips,—apart from the manner of their 
use, present any new and useful feature.”). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 472. 
119 Id. at 466. 
120 Lowe’s Drive-In Theatres Inc. v. Park-In Theaters, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, at 552 (1st 
Cir. 1949) (holding invalid a patent on drive-in theaters as obvious, but stating that that “a 
system for the transaction of business, such, for example, as the cafeteria system for 
transacting the restaurant business, … however novel, useful, or commercially successful is 
not patentable apart from the means for making the system practically useful ….”). 
Likewise, close scrutiny reveals that other cases cited as holding business methods 
unpatentable largely made their statements about the patentability of business methods in 
dicta. See, e.g., U.S. Credit System Co. v. Am. Credit Indem. Co., 59 F. 139 (2d Cir. 1893); 
In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324 (C.C.P.A. 1942).  
For an excellent discussion of the inconclusiveness of the precedent supposedly 
holding business methods unpatentable subject matter per se see Judge Newman’s dissent 
in In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 296-99 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (J. Newman, dissenting). Her 
analysis is supported by the work of several scholars, who note that the business method 
exception seems only to have appeared in dicta. See E. Robert Yoches & Howard G. 
Pollack, Is the “Method of Doing Business” Rejection Bankrupt?, 3 FED. CIR. B.J. 73 
(1993); George E. Tew, Method of Doing Business, 16 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 607, 607 (1934) 
(Continued…) 
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Over the years confidence nevertheless grew that the dicta of 
various cases that spoke skeptically of the patentability of business methods 
had in fact made business methods unpatentable subject matter.121 This 
became the accepted conventional wisdom until the Federal Circuit 
unequivocally held business methods to be patentable subject matter in the 
State Street Bank decision.  
The Federal Circuit shattered the conventional wisdom that business 
methods were unpatentable subject matter in 1998 in the State Street 
Bank122 decision. In that case the patent was on a system that kept track of 
the value of shares in a “hub and spoke” mutual fund arrangement. Various 
mutual funds (“spokes”) pooled their resources together (the “hub”) in order 
to gain economies of scale in investing and managing the portfolios. The 
system used a computer to keep track of the ownership and dollar values of 
the various funds and of the shares owned by those invested in the funds.123  
The case was initially decided by a Massachusetts district court. The 
district court held that the system was unpatentable under the alternate 
rationales of either the mathematical algorithm exception or the business 
method exception. Importantly, the district court also offered up an 
economic efficiency rationale for its decision. The district court stated that 
allowing the patent would “foreclose virtually any computer-implemented 
accounting method necessary to manage this type of financial structure.”124 
In reaching its decision, the district court clung to the physical 
transformation test and ignored the recent whittling away of the test by the 
Federal Circuit in the 1990s. Instead, the district court relied on the sixteen-
year-old Supreme Court case of Diamond v. Diehr to hold that an element 
of “physical transformation” was still necessary for patentability.125 
                                                 
(“It is probably settled by long practice and many precedents that ‘methods of doing 
business,’ as these words are generally understood, are unpatentable, notwithstanding the 
absence in decided cases of any logical or statutory reason or rule why they are 
unpatentable.”).  
121 See, generally, Rinaldo Del Gallo, III, Are “Methods of Doing Business” Finally 
Out of Business as a Statutory Rejection?, 38 IDEA 403, 405-11 (1998). 
122 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502 (D. 
Mass. 1996).  
123 Id. at 516. 
124 Id. at 516. 
125 Id. at 509. The district court said that the process in Diehr “‘involve[d] the 
transformation of an article . . . into a different state or thing.’ This element of physical 
transformation, hinted at in Benson and Flook, was made explicit in Diehr[.]” Id. (quoting 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184). This is not to say that the court’s position was without support in 
contemporary academic writing. See, e.g., Lawrence Kass, Computer Software 
(Continued…) 
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The Federal Circuit reversed,126 holding that, regardless of whether 
the system was classified as process or machine, the mathematical 
algorithm exception did not bar patentability. The court held that the 
mathematical algorithm test only refers to abstract ideas that are not useful, 
stating: “Unpatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by showing 
they are merely abstract ideas constituting disembodied concepts or truths 
that are not ‘useful.’”127 The Federal Circuit held that the district court’s 
insistence on physical transformation was no longer applicable in light of 
Chakrabarty, Diehr and the Federal Circuit’s own case law.128  
The Federal Circuit went on to specifically overrule the business 
method exception.129 As can be seen by the above discussion of the case 
law, this holding was prefigured by the trend of ever-increasing subject 
matter patentability and the fact that the business method exception had 
never been more than dicta. The court brushed aside this century-old legal 
conventional wisdom with little discussion of the policies underlying the 
exception. Instead, the court spent a few paragraphs explaining that the 
decisions typically credited with having been decided on grounds of the 
business method exception could also be explained as having been decided 
on other grounds, like lack of novelty or nonobviousness.130 The court 
dismissed the business method exception, stating that it was “tak[ing] this 
opportunity to lay this ill-conceived [business method exception] to rest.”131 
                                                 
Patentability and the Role of Means-Plus-Function Format in Computer Software Claims, 
15 PACE L. REV. 787, at 801 (1995) (“The Supreme Court elaborated on the Benson 
proscription against patenting pure mathematical algorithms in Parker v. Flook and 
Diamond v. Diehr, which collectively circumscribed what may be termed a ‘physicality 
requirement’ for processes that contain mathematical algorithms.”); Jur Strobos, Stalking 
the Elusive Patentable Software: Are There Still Diehr Or Was It Just a Flook?, 6 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 363, 387 (1993) (“These two . . . requirements for software patentability, are 
hereinafter referred to as the ‘preemption’ and ‘transformation’ inquiries, respectively . . . . 
The first addresses preemption of human use of this equation by ‘head and hand.’ The 
second addresses whether the particular claimed use is a process with a product, or a 
transformation and reduction of a particular entity, such as input data, to a different state, 
rather than an idea or ‘patent protection for that formula in the abstract.’”) (quoting Diehr, 
450 U.S. at 184). 
126 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
127 Id. at 1373.  
128 Id. at 1374. 
129 Id. at 1375. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
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The Federal Circuit barely addressed the district court’s economic 
efficiency analysis. The Federal Circuit simply responded that “[w]hether 
the patent’s claims are too broad to be patentable is not to be judged under § 
101, but rather under §§ 102, 103, and 112. Assuming the [district court] to 
be correct, it has nothing to do with whether what is claimed is statutory 
subject matter.” 
Here then the Federal Circuit neared completion of its abandonment 
of any gatekeeping function as to subject matter patentability. The Federal 
Circuit disclaimed any role in analyzing whether it is efficient to grant 
patents on certain classes of subject matter. The result of the language in the 
Federal Circuit’s State Street Bank decision was to require that virtually all 
patents be examined as to novelty, nonobviousness, and the other sections 
of the Patent Act and allowed as patentable if they met those other 
requirements. In effect, after State Street Bank the Federal Circuit’s position 
was that neither courts nor the PTO should engage in an analysis of whether 
a patent on a particular invention was needed to incentivize invention, and if 
so, whether the added incentive outweighed the deadweight loss of the 
patent grant for the particular type of invention. 
3. The Federal Circuit Retreats Further 
The positions taken by the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank have 
been repeated and confirmed in subsequent rulings. A year later, in AT&T 
Corporation v. Excel Communications, Inc.,132 the Federal Circuit again 
strictly limited the mathematical algorithm exception,133 and re-emphasized 
its rejection of the “physical transformation” test.134 The Court reiterated 
that the criterion for subject matter patentability is simply whether the 
process produces a “useful, concrete and tangible result.”135  
                                                 
132 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
133 The Federal Circuit reiterated that, “[b]ecause § 101 includes processes as a 
category of patentable subject matter, the judicially-defined proscription against patenting 
of a ‘mathematical algorithm,’ to the extent such a proscription still exists, is narrowly 
limited to mathematical algorithms in the abstract.” Id. at 1356. The invention at issue 
claimed a process for adding a data field to call billing records used by long distance 
carriers, which data field allowed the identification of the long distance carrier with whom 
each call originated. Id. at 1352-54. 
134 The Court emphasized that “physical transformation” is not “an invariable 
requirement, but merely one example of how a mathematical algorithm may bring about a 
useful application.” Id. at 1358. 
135 Id. at 1359. Of course the Federal Circuit noted that the three exceptions to subject 
matter patentability set out by the Supreme Court in Diehr still apply—“laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Id. at 1355. The Court also noted that the patent at 
(Continued…) 
48   
 
  
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences followed the Federal 
Circuit’s expansionist lead in Ex parte Lundgren.136 There the Board 
rejected the judicially created “technological arts” test of subject matter 
patentability that was developed by the CCPA in Musgrave. The 
technological arts test was originally devised by the CCPA to get around the 
“mental steps” exclusion for PSM so long as the inventions were within the 
broad field of the “technological arts.”137 
Even the very broad “technological arts” test could be used to 
prohibit patentability of some inventions, however, and the patent examiner 
in Lundgren made such a rejection. At issue in Lundgren was a method of 
compensating a manager of a private firm in an oligopoly market so as to 
reduce incentives for collusion with other firms.138 The claim at issue in 
Lundgren did not tie the claimed method to a computer or to any other 
implementing technology. Instead, the patent claimed a method of 
comparing the absolute performance of a firm against the average 
performance of the other firms in the oligopolistic market, so as to make a 
manager’s compensation dependent on her firm’s performance measured 
against the other firms in the market, rather than dependent on overall 
                                                 
issue did not pre-empt all uses of the mathematical principle it made use of and therefore 
did not run afoul of another problem that the supposed mathematical algorithm exception 
sought to prevent—the patenting of all uses of an algorithm, which would in effect be the 
patenting of an abstract idea. Id. at 1357-58.  
136 Ex Parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (B.P.A.I. 2004). 
137 See discussion and notes, supra, Part III.B.1. 
138 Note that no firm in the oligopolistic market would want to use such a method, 
because if it worked it would eliminate potential oligopoly profits. Rather, the method 
would have to be imposed on the firms by some outsider, likely a government regulator. 
Thus, Lundgren (an economist working for the federal government) was attempting to 
patent a theory of economic regulation of oligopoly markets. See Steve Seidenberg, The 
Lundgren Method, INSIDECOUNSEL MAG., Jan. 1, 2006, 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/issues/insidecounsel/15_170/ip/261-1.html. Evidence for 
this theory is amply provided by the fact that Lundgren filed an amicus brief in the 
Microsoft Antitrust remedy hearings arguing that he should be allowed to participate in the 
remedy hearings in order to demonstrate that his patent pending method would be the best 
remedy for Microsoft’s antitrust violations. As Lundgren adroitly noted in his reply brief, 
“Carl Lundgren would be prepared to argue that use of his invention would provide a better 
remedy in this case than would any other remedy. If Carl Lundgren should prevail in a fair 
contest to select the best remedy, he could earn a fortune.” Reply by Carl Lundgren to the 
Parties’ Responses to Motions Regarding Amicus Participation at 3, United States v. 
Microsoft, Corp., No. 00-5212 (D.C. Cir. 2000) available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f223500/223523b.htm). Lundgren’s attempt to patent 
theories of regulation and then have them imposed by court order suggests its own host of 
problems that space constraints prohibit investigating in this Article. 
2008] THE UTILITARIAN CASE FOR RESTRICTING PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 49 
 
profitability. The patent examiner rejected the patent application as being 
outside of the “technological arts”139 The Board of Patent Appeals, however, 
rejected that a “technological arts” test ever existed. The Board stated that 
Musgrave never required an invention to be within the technological arts, 
and that, to the extent it did, it was contrary to the Supreme Court’s later 
decision in Benson.140  
4. The Supreme Court Punts: LabCorp v. Metabolite 
The Federal Circuit continued dismantling barriers to patentable 
subject matter in Lab. Corp. of America. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 
Inc.141 In Metabolite the Federal Circuit upheld the validity of a two-step 
process patent claim that covered (1) using patented or unpatented methods 
to test for an elevated level of an amino acid called homocysteine in warm-
blooded animals and (2) correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine 
with a deficiency in either of two vitamins, cobalamin or folate.142 
Metabolite argued that any total homocysteine tests that defendant LabCorp 
performed and reported back to doctors must infringe the patent claim, 
because the relationship between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency is 
now so well-known that in looking at the homocysteine measurement 
doctors would automatically reach a conclusion about whether a vitamin 
deficiency existed.143 The jury found for Metabolite on this theory, and the 
court enjoined LabCorp from performing “any homocysteine-only test.”144  
LabCorp appealed, arguing that upholding the patent would 
improperly give “a monopoly over a basic scientific fact rather than any 
novel invention.”145 The Federal Circuit rejected LabCorp’s arguments and 
                                                 
139 Id. (stating that the invention was “an economic theory expressed as a 
mathematical algorithm without the disclosure or suggestion of computer, automated 
means, apparatus of any kind.”). 
140 Id. at 4-5. 
141 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
142 Lab. Corp. of Amer. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 129 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). The patent claim states in full: 
A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-
blooded animals comprising the steps of: 
assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and 
correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with 
a deficiency of cobalamin or folate. 
U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658, claim 13 (filed Nov.20, 1986). 
143 Metabolite, 548 U.S. at 129-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
144 Id. at 130 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
145 Id. at 131 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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affirmed. The Court did not address the subject matter patentability 
question, but instead agreed with the lower court that because the 
correlation is now well-known, almost every doctor who ordered and read 
results of homocysteine tests was a direct infringer and that LabCorp 
induced infringement by publishing continuing education articles.146  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether such a 
claim is patentable subject matter, but later dismissed the writ of certiorari 
as improvidently granted.147 Although the dissent to the dismissal of 
certiorari did not carry the day, one can see in it an attempt by three justices 
to return to a subject matter patentability gatekeeper role. Justices Stevens 
and Souter joined Justice Breyer’s dissent from the dismissal of the writ of 
certiorari, which urged that the claim was an unpatentable attempt to patent 
a “natural phenomenon.” The dissent alternately referred to the process 
claimed in Metabolite as a “law of nature” and a “phenomenon of 
nature.”148 The dissent also acknowledged that drawing the line between 
patentable and unpatentable subject matter can be difficult and arbitrary.149 
But the dissent did not view this as a reason to abandon a gatekeeping role, 
and opined that the Metabolite case was “not at the boundary.”150 The 
dissent had “little doubt that the correlation between homocysteine and 
vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a ‘natural phenomenon.’”151  
I submit that to the extent the dissent found legitimacy in the 
historical tests for subject matter patentability on the basis of the tests’ 
historical provenance rather than on the basis of their ability to prevent the 
granting of patents where there is no public goods problem, the dissent’s 
focus was misplaced. Given the recent line of cases directly rejecting the 
historical tests, the dissent might have more profitably analyzed directly 
whether allowing patents on processes such as the one claimed in 
Metabolite causes more deadweight loss from the patent monopoly than 
increase in invention. That is the important question for which the historical 
tests are only a screen.   
If such an analysis had been conducted, the Metabolite claim would 
have failed the economic litmus test. An examination of the process claimed 
in Metabolite shows that while the process does produce a useful result—
                                                 
146 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1365). 
147 Id. at 124. 
148 Id. at 132, 134 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
149 Id. at 134 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
150 Id. at 135 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
151 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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the testing for homocysteine and correlation with vitamin deficiency is no 
doubt useful in medicine—giving a blanket monopoly over all uses of the 
correlation is much more incentive than is needed to encourage discovery of 
such correlations. The dissent was correct that the other claims in the 
Metabolite patent, which covered the methods of testing for homocysteine 
that the inventors designed, should be sufficient to incentivize the discovery 
of scientific correlations such as the one at issue in the case.  
If a doctor discovers a previously unknown medical correlation, then 
she is in the best position to be the first one to design and market a test for 
that correlation. That is likely all the incentive needed to efficiently 
encourage research and discovery of scientific correlations. To give the 
discoverer a patent monopoly over all uses of the correlation, both known 
and unknown, causes a large amount of deadweight loss that is likely to 
outweigh any increased incentive to invent.152 The ability of other scientists 
to “correlate” a scientific fact from observing some phenomenon is 
obviously critical to scientific progress. To give one person the ability to 
restrict the correlations another makes in her mind is to give a very broad 
monopoly indeed, and one that the courts have historically and quite rightly 
refused to give, whether by reason of the “natural phenomenon exception”, 
the “laws of nature exception”, or the “mental steps doctrine.” 
The Metabolite patent shows that merely satisfying the Federal 
Circuit’s one remaining test for subject matter patentability—determining 
whether the patent results in a “useful, concrete, and tangible result”153—is 
not enough to prevent the grossly inefficient granting of patents. The result 
of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Metabolite is that now that the 
correlation between elevated levels of the amino acid in question and 
vitamin deficiency are known, any test for the level of that amino acid—
including tests that existed in the prior art, or new and more efficient tests 
that are later developed—will infringe the patent.154 The Federal Circuit has 
now completely surrendered the gatekeeper role with regard to patentable 
subject matter, and although three justices sought to reverse that decision in 
Metabolite, the majority of the Supreme Court remains on the sidelines in 
this debate. 
                                                 
152 The incentive is particularly outsized in the case of discoveries in the fields of 
science and medicine because much of the research is already incentivized by government 
grants, as, indeed, was the research underlying the discovery in the Metabolite patent. See 
U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658, col.1 l.7 (“The research leading to this invention was partially 
funded by grants from the U.S. government.”). 
153 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373. 
154 See Metabolite, 548 U.S. at 131-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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5. Renewed Federal Circuit Interest in Delimiting 
Patentable Subject Matter? 
Perhaps out of fear that the Supreme Court is simply waiting for a 
more fully briefed case to come before it in order to weigh in on patentable 
subject matter, the Federal Circuit has decided two recent cases in which it 
held that some process claims divorced from any hardware or machine are 
not patentable subject matter.155 In the pending case of In re Bilski the 
Federal Circuit is reconsidering its patentable subject matter jurisprudence 
en banc.156 The court asked litigants to address the specific question of 
whether the claimed method of hedging against weather risks in purchasing 
commodities qualifies as patentable subject matter.157 But the court also 
asked the parties to address, inter alia, (1) “[w]hat standard should govern 
in determining whether a process is patent-eligible subject matter under 
section 101,”158 (2) “whether a method or process must result in a physical 
transformation of an article or be tied to a machine to be patent-eligible 
subject matter”, and (3) whether the court’s business method cases should 
be reconsidered or overruled in any respect.159  
The Federal Circuit has an opportunity to return its jurisprudence on 
patentable subject matter to a position that increases social welfare by 
denying patentability to subject matter that do not need the additional 
incentive of a patent grant to be produced at efficient levels. Ideally the 
Federal Circuit would reclaim its role of crafter of section 101 common law. 
If it does so, the Federal Circuit should proclaim that both Congressional 
intent and the fact that the Constitution grants Congress the patent power 
                                                 
155 In In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the invention was a new method 
of  “watermarking” signals. These signals might carry audio or any other type of 
information. Nuijten was granted claims for (1) the process of watermarking the signals, 
(2) structural means and machinery for encoding the signal, and (3) encoded signals stored 
in a storage medium. The PTO rejected Claim 14 (and dependent claims), which covered 
the encoded signal on its own, without reference to any storage medium. The Federal 
Circuit held that Claim 14 was properly rejected as unpatentable subject matter. The Court 
held that a signal, being transitory and intangible, complies with none of the four categories 
for patentable subject matter under § 101 (process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter). 
In In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (2007), the Court rejected claims to a method of 
arbitration that were not tied to any implementing system or machine. The Court held that 
claims tied to software were patentable subject matter. 
156 In re Bilski, 264 Fed. App’x 896 (2008). 
157 Id.  
158 Id.  
159 Id.  
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solely “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” means that 
those subject matter that do not need the incentive of the patent grant are 
not eligible for patents under section 101.  
If the Federal Circuit is not comfortable declaring that under section 
101 areas that do not need patents cannot have them, then it would do well 
to at least revert to one of its old proxy tests for efficiency of patentable 
subject matter. The Court could reaffirm its physical transformation test for 
patentable subject matter. Reclaiming this test would eliminate patentability 
for business methods, as well as for most software claims that are not tied to 
some industrial or mechanical process. While this may exclude from 
patentability some inventions that need the incentive of patents to be 
adequately produced, it seems likely that it would prevent the patenting of 
far more inventions that have no need of the patent incentive. Avoiding 
patenting these inventions would decrease deadweight loss from patents, 
lighten the load on the Patent Office, decrease the costs of patent thickets in 
these areas, and allow innovation in these areas without any fear of patent 
infringement.   
IV. Application of the Model to Business Methods 
With the courts’ abdication of their historical gatekeeper roles and 
their adoption of a bare textualist reading of the Patent Act, nearly anything 
now qualifies as patentable subject matter. Can this possibly be efficient? 
Although I have just suggested that the answer is no in the above discussion 
of Metabolite and Bilski, I turn to another class of subject matter to provide 
a definitive answer to the question, for fear that Metabolite and Bilski may 
be labeled outliers by some.  
This part of the Article makes use of the categories set out in Part II, 
above, to evaluate whether business methods are most likely to correspond 
to the situation where patentability causes more deadweight loss to society 
than gain from increased invention (Figure 2), and thus should receive no 
patent protection, or to correspond to the situation where limited 
patentability produces more welfare gain from increased invention than 
deadweight loss from the patent monopoly (Figure 3), and thus should 
receive limited patent protection.160 
Even if business methods correspond to Figure 2, where 
patentability is never efficient, it may still be efficient to grant patent 
protection. If business methods cannot practically be separated from other 
processes, such as software, society must analyze them together, as one 
                                                 
160 See Figures in Part II.B., supra. 
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large class of general processes. In such a case, if the benefits from granting 
patent protections to the larger class outweigh the deadweight losses from 
granting business methods patent protection, society should grant the entire 
class patent protection. If the benefits from granting the larger class patent 
protection are less than the deadweight losses from granting business 
methods patent protection, society should deny the entire class patent 
protection.  
There is strong reason to believe that business methods lie on Figure 
2 where patenting is never efficient. Particularly in the case of business 
methods, the level of incentive to invent new and useful business methods is 
quite high without any patent protection. Recall that an inventor’s end goal 
(to say nothing of a businessperson’s) is to maximize profits. A new 
business method increases profits by making a firm a more efficient 
producer, improving the quality of the firm’s product, decreasing costs of 
production, or simply by more effectively marketing the product. The effect 
of the business method may be either or both of decreased costs (a more 
efficient business produces the same good at less cost) and increased 
revenue (a firm that produces a better product can sell more goods and/or 
charge a higher price).  
In a highly competitive market, a firm that offers even a slight drop 
in price or improvement in service reaps large gains in extra sales, and thus 
large gains in revenue. While rivals will copy the method, they generally do 
not do so until the method has been proven successful. Further, it takes time 
to learn and institute a new method. Thus, in the short run (the time it takes 
for rivals to copy the new business method) the inventing firm receives 
exclusive benefits of the new method. Often, just this temporary increase in 
revenue will be enough to make the invention worthwhile (i.e. to outweigh 
the relatively low cost of invention in the field of business methods). 
Trade secret law provides a further incentive to invest in business 
methods, in that it allows firms to extend their enjoyment of the revenue 
increases they can achieve in the “short run” for as long as they can keep 
their new business methods secret.161 This increases revenue in the firm’s 
profit equation, and thus increases the amount that a firm will be willing to 
spend on invention. A firm achieves trade secret status by implementing 
confidentiality and security requirements. In addition, firms make use of 
                                                 
161 Actually, a firm must merely take the appropriate steps to keep its methods secret, 
and then courts will protect against and give remedies for unauthorized distribution of the 
methods in many cases. Of course, a competitor is always free to reverse engineer the trade 
secret method, if it can.  
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employee contracts that bind their employees to conceal confidential 
business methods from rivals, giving the firm exclusive use.162 A firm thus 
quickly and cheaply achieves a form of monopoly protection without any 
foray into the patent application process.163  
The trade secret regime has a substantial efficiency advantage over 
patent law. Private parties are allowed to establish their own levels of 
protection for each trade secret. The government does not have to evaluate 
each trade secret method to determine whether it should be patented and the 
breadth of claims that should be allowed. Instead, the trade secret regime 
puts the determination of the level of protection on the party with the most 
information about the value of the protection as opposed to its cost. In other 
words, the inventing firm can obtain a higher level of trade secret protection 
by taking more steps to keep the information secret, or it may obtain a lower 
level of protection by expending less on precautions to keep the process 
secret.164 Thus the trade secret regime places the evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of trade secret protection on the firms—those entities that have the 
                                                 
162 Note that the level of trade secret protection varies from state to state, and is fairly 
weak in some states, like California, where a higher premium is placed on employee 
mobility and the free flow of information. See Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a 
Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 443-44 (2007) (“[D]espite this 
universal recognition and near-universal origin of trade secrets protection, states vary 
widely in their treatment of trade secret misappropriation....For example, a number of states 
have not adopted the UTSA’s central definition of ‘trade secret.’ California dropped the 
UTSA requirement that a trade secret not be ‘readily ascertainable by proper means.’”); 
Adam Gill, Note, The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: Inequitable Results are Threatened 
but not Inevitable, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 403, 416 (2002) (“[T]he codification of 
[California Business and Professions Code 16600] and the related case law leave no doubt 
that California places a high value on and has a strong tradition of protecting employee 
mobility.”). 
163 Some business methods may not be able to be kept secret if they are used. 
Amazon’s 1-Click method of selling products, for instance, has to be publicized to be used. 
Amazon can, of course, both keep secret and copyright the underlying code, but the method 
of selling must be revealed to be utilized. On the other hand, in some instances the 
monopoly protection can be strong and long-lasting. Coca-Cola has kept the formula for 
Coke a trade secret for over a century. David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: 
Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 156 (2007) (“[T]he 
formula for Coca-Cola, which is not patented, is the most famous example of a trade secret 
and has existed as a trade secret for over 100 years.”). 
164 For instance, courts will give more protection to secrets when precautions are taken 
to strictly limit knowledge of them to those with a need to know, when physical security 
features are put in place, or when all materials having to do with the trade secret are clearly 
marked “confidential” or “top secret.” See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV, 
Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991).  
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lowest costs to gather the relevant information. The firms then internalize 
and weigh all the relevant factors discussed above. The inventing firm 
considers the costs of inventing, the increased rewards from using the new 
business method, and the costs of trade secret protection, and then decide 
whether to engage in the costs of inventing and the appropriate level of 
protection for the resulting process.165 Rival firms consider, and act to get in 
on, the economic profits being gained by the inventing firm. When rivals 
enter a single-player market and convert it to a competitive one, they divide 
up the would-be monopolist’s profits until such point that enough rivals 
have entered the market to drive deadweight loss down to zero. If the 
economic profits (and corresponding societal deadweight loss) are high, 
rivals will likely invest enough to invent the new business methods on their 
own.166 
In addition, the internal structure of many firms may provide 
additional incentives to invent new business methods. Employees are 
promoted through the managerial ranks for improving a firm’s efficiency. 
The prospect of promotion and a pay raise provides employees significant 
independent incentive to invent.167 Further, if firms face a low cost of 
                                                 
165 Firms will not automatically seek maximum trade secret protection. Employees do 
not like contract provisions that limit their ability to work for a competitor in the future, or 
that threaten to penalize them if they reveal secrets. The employer will have to raise wages 
to compensate employees for this inconvenience. Thus, the employer will choose the level 
of trade secret protection for which increased revenues outweigh increased wages and other 
costs. 
166 The resources the second firm spends inventing the same business method is 
economic waste. Therefore if business methods are expensive to invent, patent protection 
might be a less costly alternative than the regime of trade secret protection, because patent 
holders must disclose their inventions. Additionally, if some business methods are 
sufficiently nonobvious that other firms will not be able to invent them, then a twenty-year 
patent protection accompanied by disclosure would be less costly to society than allowing 
the inventing firm to have a perpetual monopoly.  
 It should be noted, however, that even though patent protection may be cheaper 
than trade secret protection for some inventions, allowing a firm to choose between the two 
options is likely the least efficient alternative. This is because firms will choose the option 
that has maximum anti-competitive effect each time, that is, the firm will opt for whichever 
option will provide the longest period of monopoly. 
167 But see literature suggesting that there is a general decrease in innovation within 
firms compared to without. See, e.g., Kim B. Clark, The Interaction of Design Hierarchies 
and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution, 14 RES. POL’Y 235-51 (1985); Richard 
N. Foster & Sarah Kaplan, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: WHY COMPANIES THAT ARE BUILT 
TO LAST UNDERPERFORM THE MARKET—AND HOW TO SUCCESSFULLY TRANSFORM THEM 
(2001). Cf. Paul Romer, Thinking and Feeling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 439 (2000). The 
literature argues that several factors converge to decrease innovation within a firm. First, 
(Continued…) 
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invention, the free rider problem may not lead to underproduction of the 
invention.  
The nature of business methods indicates that a low cost of 
invention is probable. When a pharmaceutical company attempts to 
synthesize a new drug, it must hire researchers for lengthy periods of time, 
                                                 
while innovators generally do not capture the full benefit of their innovations, they may 
face the full brunt of the punishment for a risk gone bad. Second, managers often do not 
really know what potential innovators do and so do not do well in giving innovators 
resources and incentives to innovate. Third, Professor Clayton Christensen maintains that 
market players do especially poorly in coming up with innovation in the form of 
“disruptive technologies”—i.e. innovation that leads to disruption in the market or in the 
way a firm does business. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: THE 
REVOLUTIONARY NATIONAL BESTSELLER THAT CHANGED THE WAY WE DO BUSINESS 
(1997). According to Professor Christensen, while leading firms outperform others in 
perfecting existing technology in the market, they consistently miss identifying and 
developing disruptive technologies. The reason for this, according to Christensen, is that 
firms see it as rationale to pursue continued revenue from providing customers with 
marginally improved technology, but see great risk in betting on a new and disruptive 
technology, and consistently decline to take that risk. According to Professor Christensen’s 
study of the issue, it is outside firms that consistently are willing to bet their firms to enter 
the market and pursue the disruptive technologies. 
Even taking the above arguments at face value, however, there is reason to believe that 
while innovation may be a problem within certain market-leading firms, it is not a problem 
within the market as a whole. For while innovators within a firm may not reap the full 
benefit of their innovations, while reaping the full costs of mistakes, entrepreneurs outside 
the firms can generally receive the full benefit of their innovation upon entering a market. 
Indeed, Professor Christensen’s work shows that outside innovators consistently enter the 
market to make innovative leaps forward. And note that Professor Christensen’s study 
found this level of innovation before the advent of business method patents. 
On the other hand, Bessen and Meurer argue that most important innovation does 
occur within firms: 
[S]ome people claim that almost all “breakthrough” inventions come 
from small inventors, and their interests should be paramount in debates 
about patent reform . . . . There are good reasons to think that small 
inventors make important inventions. This is not true of all types of small 
inventors, of course; many small inventors patent games, simple 
machines, and other low-tech inventions. Nevertheless, many small 
inventors do make important high-tech inventions. But there is no 
evidence to suggest that most breakthrough inventions come from small 
inventors. What limited evidence—for example, the characteristics of 
inventors nominated to the National Inventors Hall of Fame—suggest 
that most recent major inventions originated in large organizations, 
although a significant minority of important inventions are developed by 
independent inventors or inventors working in small firms. 
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
INNOVATORS AT RISK 19-20 (2008). 
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and the overhead for research laboratories and product development is quite 
costly. In addition, it is expensive and time-consuming to complete FDA 
trials and win approval to sell a new drug. Most new business methods, 
however, are developed in the normal course of business. Large 
independent labor expenditures are not needed to create them. Further, new 
business methods often simply increase efficiencies within the company. A 
firm has an incentive to closely tailor new methods to its structure. Rivals 
with different structures will find it more difficult to copy the tailored 
methods, and the inventing firm thus will enjoy a longer period of 
exclusivity. 
In addition, business method patents will often merely serve to 
redistribute rents among existing parties rather than enhancing innovation. 
This is because many business methods are simply creative marketing 
techniques. They are not technological advances that increase society’s 
productive capacity; they simply divert existing consumers from one 
purchase to another.  
The case of In re Maucorps168 is illustrative. Here, patent protection 
was denied to “a computer-implemented model of a sales organization” that 
determined “the optimum number of times a sales representative for a 
business should visit each customer over a period of time. The optimum 
number of sales representatives the organization should have, and the 
optimum organization of sales representatives.”169 As the Court stated, the 
ultimate effect was that the applicant “arrive[d] at the optimum business 
organization.”170  
Although the court denied patent protection under the mathematical 
algorithm exception, not the business method exception,171 the case aptly 
illustrates why patents should be denied to such things as business 
marketing methods. It is doubtful that the applicant in Maucorps increased 
society’s productive capacity through his organization method: more likely 
he merely diverted some customers from rival firms to his own firm. It is 
difficult to see what interest society has in redistributing economic rents 
among private parties. 
                                                 
168 609 F.2d 481 (1979). 
169 Id. at 481. 
170 Id. at 482. 
171 See id. at 484-85. See also State Street Bank,149 F.3d at 1376 (reading In re 
Marcoups as rejecting the patent claim under the “‘mathematical algorithm exception,’ not 
the business method exception”). 
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One might counter that while protections for marketing devices 
provide society little benefit, they likely produce little harm. After all, rents 
are merely reallocated among parties leaving aggregate social utility 
unaffected. But Louis Kaplow has described a general danger of patent 
misuse that applies in cases such as this. Kaplow shows that all patent 
protection in the business context carries the danger of decreasing social 
utility.172 When competing businesses hold potentially conflicting patents, 
they may either sue one another for infringement, or they may settle their 
claims. Risk aversion will lead many competitors to reach a settlement 
under which each party grants a cross-license to the other even if the patents 
have questionable validity.  
Kaplow shows that companies can utilize such cross-licensing 
agreements as court-enforceable controls for cartel pricing.173 Suppose, for 
example, that Amazon.com, Borders, and Barnes & Noble each hold a 
patent for a method of online book shopping. Suppose online book 
shopping is a market of three; these firms hold the only three patents for 
online book shopping. In a world with no cross licensing, they would be 
competitors. Efforts to form a cartel would likely fail as the rewards to 
cheating (increased market share) would be large, and cartel monitoring 
would be difficult. Through cross-licensing agreements, however, these 
competitors gain access to one another’s accounting records. They can thus 
monitor output and pricing. Further, license fees could be raised to punish 
cartel cheaters. Thus, cross-licensing business methods could create 
additional monopolies wider in scope than the original patent protection 
intended, and create additional deadweight losses to society.174 This general 
danger of patent misuse is yet another reason to withhold patentability from 
subject matter areas in which there is not clear evidence that the benefits 
from patentability significantly outweigh the costs.175 
                                                 
172 See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1813 (1984). See also, Herbert Hovenkamp; Mark D. Janis and Mark A. Lemley, 
Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 
(2003) (“Because . . . competitors may agree to stop competing, to regulate the price each 
charges, and to exchange information about products and prices, settlements of IP disputes 
naturally raise antitrust concerns.”) 
173 Id.  
174 Id. 
175 Nevertheless, as Professor Merges notes, some commentators ignore the cost-
benefit analysis of patentability of business methods and instead simply argue that business 
methods should be patentable because everything else is. See Merges, As Many as Six 
(Continued…) 
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It is important to remember that copying business rivals is not 
inherently bad. In fact, the functioning of a free market depends on it. 
Proponents of business method patents ignore the fact that business 
methods are among those things that we most want firms to be able to copy. 
The very basis of efficient markets is the ability of firms to see an 
economically profitable business opportunity and move into that market so 
as to drive economic profits down until all deadweight loss is squeezed out 
of the market and producer and consumer surplus is maximized in the 
aggregate. Whereas it may be necessary for firms to be granted patents on 
their new products in order to encourage the optimal amount of invention of 
new products, it is less likely that it is necessary to subsidize firms to figure 
out the best ways to market and sell their new products, or the best ways to 
run their business operations more efficiently so as to decrease costs and 
increase profits.176 Moreover, allowing some firms to patent methods of 
                                                 
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent 
System Reform 14 BERKLEY TECH L.J. 577 (1999). 
176 Indeed, it is arguable that the four largest groupings of business method patent 
filings (Class 705) are for functions that firms are incentivized to constantly improve on 
their own simply by virtue of operating in competitive markets. The PTO White Paper on 
Business Methods sets out the following as the four largest groups for patent filings within 
Class 705: 
1. Determining Who Your Customers Are, and The Products/Services They 
Need/Want 
Operations Research - Market Analysis 
2. Informing Customers You Exist, Showing Them Your Products & 
Services, and Getting Them to Purchase 
Advertising Management 
Catalog Systems 
Incentive Programs 
Redemption of Coupon 
3. Exchanging Money and Credit Before, During, and After the Business 
Transaction 
Credit and Loan Processing 
Point of Sale Systems 
Billing 
Funds Transfer 
Banking 
Clearinghouses 
Tax Processing 
Investment Planning 
4. Tracking Resources, Money, And Products 
Human Resource Management 
Scheduling 
(Continued…) 
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doing business such that their rivals cannot organize themselves in the most 
efficient manners for a period of twenty years may have much larger costs 
in terms of deadweight loss to society than the granting of patents on 
particular products. When a firm is issued a patent on a product, its rivals 
cannot produce that product unless licensed to do so. When a firm is 
granted a patent on a method of doing business, however, it can prevent its 
rivals from using the more efficient method, and make the costs of all of its 
rivals’ goods relatively more expensive, thus driving up deadweight loss 
across an industry instead of merely for a particular product.177 The benefits 
of the patent would have to be very great indeed to justify this result. 
The preceding discussion suggests that incentives to create new 
business methods (either within firms or without) are already quite high 
without patent protection and that the increase in incentive from patent 
protection is therefore likely to be fairly small. Further, the extension of 
patent protection to business methods likely causes large deadweight loss to 
society. Thus, business methods likely correspond to Figure 2, where the 
amount of deadweight loss from each amount of patent protection is always 
greater than the invention corresponding to each amount of patent 
protection. This means that business methods as a class should be placed 
among those subjects, like natural phenomena and abstract ideas, that 
should be excluded from patent protection. 
The only reason not to make business methods unpatentable subject 
matter is if the condition mentioned at the start of this section applies—if 
business methods cannot be reliably separated into their own subject matter 
category. The complete answer to this question is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but some initial thoughts can be offered.  
First, even though some difficult line drawing may sometimes be 
called for in deciding whether to classify an invention as a business method, 
in many cases the classification will not be difficult.  
                                                 
Accounting 
Inventory Monitoring 
PTO BUSINESS METHODS WHITE PAPER, at section III. While arguments may exist as to 
whether firms are adequately incentivized to improve in all four of the above groups, it 
seems inarguable that prior to patent protection, firms are already incentivized to 
continually improve their business practices in groups 1 and 2 even in the absence of any 
patent protection.  
177 Imagine the loss in utility if Federal Express’s “hub and spoke” delivery method 
had been patented. Or the utility loss that would have occurred if Wal-Mart had exclusive 
rights to its “just-in-time” warehousing and shipping method. Or consider the more severe 
losses to society if Adam Smith had been able to patent the division of labor method he 
instituted at his pen factory. 
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Second, the mere existence of some difficult line-drawing cases is 
not typically enough to turn a court away from an otherwise sensible 
distinction. Even though it may have become more difficult to draw the line 
between business methods and business processes due to the increased 
importance of computers, information, and services in the “new economy,” 
the line between business methods and patentable processes has been drawn 
fairly successfully by courts for a century. Further, there has been no 
suggestion by the Federal Circuit that the duty of drawing lines between 
business methods and other processes has become so difficult as to be 
impossible, or even that uncertainty over where the line lay was causing an 
excessive number of appeals on the issue.178 
Third, the other types of patents that may be hard to distinguish from 
business method patents are software patents (in cases in which the business 
method is implemented through software or computers) and process patents 
generally. Even if some “business method” inventions are disguised as 
software or other process inventions in their patent applications, this does 
not augur against making business methods unpatentable. If claims for 
business methods are disguised as software patents, then each claim will at 
least be tied to a software implementation and therefore the breadth of the 
patent will be narrower than one claiming a pure business method. 
Additionally, even if some business methods are allowed to issue as patents 
under the guise of ordinary processes, many of the most troubling or 
socially useless business method patents—patents on business structure, 
organization, or marketing—will be among those inventions that are most 
easily identifiable as business methods, and therefore will not be patentable. 
In other words, even if there is some slippage on the periphery, the rule 
against business method patents should nevertheless serve to prohibit 
patenting of core business methods. 
Fourth, if business methods remain patentable, then drawing the line 
between business method patents and other unpatentable subject matter may 
be equally or more difficult than drawing the line between unpatentable 
processes and business methods. Would music videos have been classified 
as patentable business methods if such patent protection had been available 
at the time of their invention? How about “junk” bonds? Would they be 
classified as patentable business methods or as unpatentable financing 
                                                 
178 Instead, in State Street Bank, the Federal Circuit simply abandoned any gate-
keeping role or efficiency analysis and ruled that textually there is no statutory basis to 
exclude business methods from patentability. Thus there has never been a congressional or 
judicial finding that the line would be more difficult to draw than the many difficult lines 
courts must draw in all areas of the law.  
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tools? Likewise, would Walter Lipton’s invention of the “poison pill” in the 
1980’s be granted patent protection as a business method, or would it be 
classified as some sort of unpatentable shareholder self-governance? The 
slippery slope of patents for processes not resulting in physically changed 
products does not end with business methods, but rather may drop off even 
more precipitously thereafter.179  
V. Implications and Suggested Solutions 
A. Revival of the Gatekeeper Role 
An obvious conclusion results: because it remains efficient to 
analyze classes of subject matter and exclude some classes from 
patentability, the gatekeeper role should be revived. Once this delegation is 
made, a systematic analysis of suspect classes of subject matter should be 
made, starting with business methods, and likely continuing to software and 
beyond.  
As has been shown, the federal courts’ abandonment of the subject 
matter patentability gatekeeper role has decreased total social utility and 
PTO efficiency. Accordingly, if the courts do not take the role back upon 
themselves—which the Supreme Court could do, but probably will not, and 
which the Federal Circuit almost certainly will not do—then it makes sense 
for Congress to take up the role or to delegate it. While Congress could take 
on the role of determining efficient subject matter itself, it is probably not 
the body best suited to the task. Congress probably does not have the time 
or the ability to focus the extended attention necessary to come up with the 
best determinations of subject matter patentability. In addition, Congress 
                                                 
179 In addition, problems with determining patent boundaries may lead to even greater 
deterrence of innovation in fields subject to patenting. See JAMES BESSEN AND 
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS 
PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 56 (2008): 
But the hard fact is, innovators cannot quickly and easily obtain a reliable 
judgment on whether prospective technology infringes on others’ patents. 
Perhaps in an earlier time, when technology was simpler, this was not 
such a serious problem because the ambiguity of patent claims was not so 
great. But. . . there are reasons to think that this ambiguity has been 
increasing substantially in recent years. In addition, changes made during 
the 1990s in the legal methods used to determine the boundaries of 
patents appear to have made the uncertainty even greater. 
Id. 
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suffers from the well-known problems of industry capture and susceptibility 
to lobbying.180  
A better choice probably would be for Congress to delegate the 
gatekeeper role to an administrative agency. An administrative agency, such 
as the PTO, could devote the time and resources necessary for thorough 
analysis.181 An agency could hire and/or consult with economists, industry 
members, academics, etc., so as to have a much greater factual and 
analytical framework available to it in making its determination than a court 
would typically have available to it from the submissions of the parties to a 
dispute.182 In addition, the administrative rulemaking process is probably 
best adapted to making rules on patentable subject matter, because of the 
additional provisions for public comment. 
                                                 
180 See Andrew E. Jankowich, Property and Democracy in Virtual Worlds, 11 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 173, 200 (2005) (“Congress has a poor history of crafting statutes to deal 
with technological and intellectual property issues and is likely to focus only on issues that 
are controversial or are raised by large organized lobbies.”); Vincent R. Johnson, 
Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12 
(2006) (“Although modern practices are more subtle, lobbying continues to pose threats to 
the proper operation of government. This is particularly true in cases where lobbyists 
distort relevant facts, produce decisions based on favoritism rather than the merits, or give 
some segments of the community a real or perceived unfair advantage in securing access to 
members of government.”) 
181 An agency could also take into account the amount and likelihood of other 
invention incentives for a particular subject matter in making a determination of whether 
that subject matter should be patentable. For instance, an agency tasked with determining 
whether scientific correlations should be patentable subject matter could analyze how much 
of the research that leads to the discovery of such correlations is already incentivized by 
other means, such as the government grant that underwrote some of the research in the 
Metabolite patent. See U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 col.1 l.7 (“The research leading to this 
invention was partially funded by grants from the U.S. government.”). 
182 That the amount and forms of legal protection needed to incentivize innovation 
seems to vary by industry is an additional factor that points to the appropriateness of 
having an administrative agency determine patentable subject matter. See FTC, TO 
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY, ch. 3, at 1 (2003) (finding that “issues of fixed cost recovery, alternative 
appropriability mechanisms, and relationships between initial and follow-on innovation” 
differ by industry); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 1575, 1588-89 (2003) (“In short, innovation differs by industry in a variety of 
ways. Each distinct technology displays an idiosyncratic profile of technical and economic 
determinants for research, development, and return on investment. Given this, there is no a 
priori reason to believe that a single type of legal incentive will work best for every 
industry. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that achieving optimal innovation in 
different industries will require greater or lesser measures of legal incentive, and in some 
cases perhaps even no legal incentive at all.”).  
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Congress may want to specifically delegate to the rulemaking 
agency the authority to treat different classes of subject matter differently. 
For example, if it is not most efficient simply to disallow patentability for 
certain types of subject matter, it may make sense to grant certain subject 
matter shorter periods of patentability so as to maximize efficiency. An 
agency might find that it is more efficient to patent software for shorter 
periods of time, whereas twenty-year patents on drugs continue to make 
sense.183 An additional advantage to delegating the role to an administrative 
agency is that the agency could more easily adjust the level of protection if 
it is found that the level selected by the agency is either inefficiently high or 
low. Once Congress has passed legislation on complex matters like patent 
coverage, it is less likely to soon retread that ground.184  
B. Additional Complication of International Agreements 
One factor that impacts Congress’s ability to fully delegate 
determination of subject matter patentability and term is found in the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
                                                 
183 This idea is not new. In 2000, Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, suggested that 
patents on Internet methods be limited to 3-5 years. Matt Richtel, Chairman of Amazon 
Urges Reduction of Patent Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2000 at B4. This might make 
sense for patents on business methods or software because for these subject matters costs of 
invention may be quite low, but not so low that a smaller amount of patent protection does 
not have a positive effect on the amount of invention that is not outweighed by the 
deadweight loss to monopoly. Thus, some small amount of patent protection—like a three 
to five year patent term—might give businesses an additional small incentive to invent 
without causing an equal or greater deadweight loss. Deadweight loss might in turn become 
greater than additional invention after three to five years, if the amount of invention does 
not increase much with the additional patent protection. 
184 This is exemplified by the fitful course of current patent reform legislation in 
Congress. See Charlene Carter, Conflicting Views Mire Patent Reform, ROLL CALL, June 
19, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 11550290; Seth Stern, Economic Worries and 
Manufacturing Interests Threaten Patent Overhaul, CQ TODAY, April 4, 2008, available at 
2008 WLNR 6665327; Robert Pear, Patent Bill is Bonanza to Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, April 
30, 2008, at C1; Sheila Riley, Proposed Bill to Stop ‘Patent Trolls’ Supported by Big Tech 
Companies, INV. BUS. DAILY, May 29, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 10075009; Nuala 
Moran, U.S. Patent Reforms Might Force Firms to Rely on Trade Secrets, 19 BIOWORLD 
TODAY, June 23, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 11689592; New BIO Study Concludes 
Patent ‘Reform’ Legislation Would Impose Significant Costs on Patent System and Could 
Undermine U.S. Innovation and Economic Growth, LIFE SCI. WKLY, Feb. 26, 2008, at 
3894, available at 2008 WLNR 3442226. 
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(“TRIPs”).185 The TRIPs agreement states “patents shall be available for any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application.”186 The TRIPs agreement does not pose a problem for 
the exclusion of business methods from section 101 patentable subject 
matter, because business methods may reasonably be defined as not being 
within a “field of technology,” and often are not capable of “industrial 
application” in any strict sense. No other country has as yet explicitly 
included business methods within its patentable subject matter. Thus the 
United States has broken from the practice in other nations by allowing the 
patenting of business methods, so forbidding them patent protection would 
bring the United States back into harmony with other countries. 
When it comes to the patentability of other subject matters, such as 
software, for instance, the TRIPs agreement may have more of an impact. 
Currently, however, Europe and Japan do not interpret TRIPs to mandate 
coverage of software, so here too an agency could make determinations as 
to subject matter patentability without running afoul of TRIPs. 
The issue of variable patent terms does directly conflict with the 
TRIPs agreement, however. The TRIPs agreement explicitly states that 
patent protection shall extend for at least twenty years from the date of 
filing the application.187 Accordingly, the TRIPs Agreement would have to 
be amended to allow for this disparate treatment of different classes of 
subject matter. Unfortunately, the price of uniformity in international patent 
laws is a decreased ability to locally shape efficient patent protection. Thus, 
in order to allow flexibility in patent terms the effort would have to be taken 
up both at the national and international levels. 
                                                 
185 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, reprinted 
in SELECTED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION STATUTES, 
REGULATIONS AND TREATIES 847 (Roger E. Schecter ed., 2004) [hereinafter SELECTED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STATUTES].  
186 Id. at Article 27, ¶ 1; see also id. at n.5 (“For the purposes of this Article, the terms 
‘inventive step’ and ‘capable of industrial application’ may be deemed by a Member to be 
synonymous with the terms ‘non-obvious’ and ‘useful’ respectively.”). 
187 See id. at Art. 33 (“The term of protection available shall not end before the 
expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.”); see also id. at Art. 27 
(“patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . the 
field of technology . . . .”). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has analyzed the historical role that federal courts have 
played as gatekeepers of subject matter patentability and why they 
eventually abandoned that role. The review of the courts’ decisions showed 
that this abandonment was neither a single impetuous expansion of subject 
matter patentability, nor a reasoned analysis of the efficiency of expansion. 
Rather, it was slow and steady erosion that occurred as judges 
unsuccessfully attempted to adjust traditional tests for subject matter 
patentability to fit the contours of new technology and the Information Age. 
The increasing value of software programs pressured courts to protect 
software processes through the patent law. In order to do this, first the 
Federal Circuit, and then the Supreme Court, moved away from tests that 
used physical/nonphysical distinctions to determine the line between 
patentable subject matter and unpatentable abstract ideas. The courts thus 
struck down the physical transformation test, the mathematical algorithm 
exception, and, most recently, the business method exception.  
This Article has shown how the courts’ gradual abdication of their 
gatekeeper role has allowed the patentability of virtually every subject 
matter. The result has been a flood of new patents drawn to subject matter 
that formerly were unpatentable. This Article has explained that this 
approach is unnecessarily costly for society. The Article’s case study of 
business method patents provides a prime example of a type of subject 
matter for which allowing patentability makes society worse off. 
Accordingly, this Article recommends that either the courts or Congress 
revive the gatekeeper role. If Congress takes up the task, this Article 
suggests that the role might profitably be delegated to an administrative 
agency that can perform the analyses necessary to determine the classes of 
subject matter for which it is utility-enhancing to grant patentability, and for 
which classes it is not. 
